Venus scores 4 points above Euler V2, led by oracle liquidation price, rate authorship, and shortfall record. Venus ranks #1 and Euler V2 #4 of 8 published lending & borrowing. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
VEVenus81
vs
Euler V277
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #1 and #4 of 8
Venus scores 4 points above Euler V2, led by oracle liquidation price, rate authorship, and shortfall record.
VEVenus #1 of 881
Euler V2 #4 of 877
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termVenus leads on 3 of 4 published criteria; Euler V2 on 1. The terms sum to the gap.
TermVenusEuler V2WeightPoints
Oracle liquidation price9/107/107.7+4.0for Venus+2.0 of 32
Blast radius7/109/105.8−3.0for Euler V2−1.5 of 32
Rate authorship9/108/105.8+1.5for Venus+0.8 of 32
Shortfall record9/108/104.8+1.2for Venus+0.6 of 32
Net of the terms+3.7
Criteria roundingThe criteria block is rounded to whole points before it is spread−0.1
Reproduced gap+3.6
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below8177+4.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
VenusScore 81A shared-pool onchain money market whose BNB Chain book is 99.5% of the protocol and where, for that book, Venus publishes per-market oracle tiers with numeric cross-source bounds and links each tier to its deployed oracle contract - while its own forum carries dated, quantified post-mortems of the four times it lost lender money, including admissions its docs never repeat.Strength: Oracle liquidation price — 9/10Watch-out: Read https://docs-v4.venus.io/guides/isolated-pools-deprecation before you deposit - 'Venus isolated pools have been fully deprecated' - and then re-read the risk documentation knowing that. Almost everything Venus publishes about containing a loss automatically (the Shortfall auction, now paused - 'auctionsPaused() returned true' at a 27 Aug 2026 snapshot - and the healAccount write-off that 'records borrowBalance - actualRepayAmount as market badDebt') is scoped to those retired pools, and the risk-fund page, rewritten about a month before the 2026-09-28 read, says 'There is no universal on-chain function that automatically applies RiskFundV2 to every Venus bad-debt balance. Core Pool and isolated-pool accounting differ'. The FAQ still advertises isolated pools as preventing 'failures in one market from impacting others'. In practice a Core deficit is repaired only when governance votes to repair it from the Risk Fund - which it has done, twice, in full (VIP-564 2025-11-07, VIP-604 2026-03-30) - but that is a discretionary act, not a waterfall; the fund is on the order of 1% of Core debt, its balance is published nowhere, and the same page now calls it 'protocol-controlled funds allocated by governance; they are not a per-user insurance policy'. Second thing to read, and it is the one a leveraged holder underweights: the deprecation guide states that a missing price on any market in your position can block the exit - redeeming or calling exitMarket 'causes the Comptroller to check the account across all currently listed entered markets in that pool', and if the oracle 'still cannot produce a valid price for any required market, the operation can revert. exitMarket performs the same full-balance redeem check and generally cannot bypass that condition.' Third: the THE post-mortem concedes the published band did not stop the March 2026 attack - 'the BoundValidator reverted for approximately 37 minutes' and then accepted the manipulated price (THE carries the 1.05/0.95 band on the oracle table). The bounds are real, numeric and better disclosed than most of this pool, but they are a cross-source sanity check, not a manipulation-proof price.Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Quick facts
At a glance
3 of 4 rows read the same for both.
FactVenusEuler V2
PricingSnapshotVenus takes no deposit, withdrawal or curator fee on a direct Core supply; the protocol's take is each market's reserve factor. The Interest Rate Model page (https://docs-v4.venus.io/risk/interest-rate-model, fetched 28 September 2026) defines it inside the supply-rate formula - "For those models, if r_b is the borrow rate per slot and f is the reserve factor" - and states that it publishes no per-market value: "This is a model-selection overview, not a per-market configuration registry." The live values are API fields, not page text: https://api.venus.io/markets?chainId=56 on 28 September 2026 returned reserveFactorMantissa of 0.1 for USDT and USDC, 0.2 for ETH and 0.3 for BTCB and BNB, the largest BNB Core markets by borrows. The sentence this note carried until now (the old glossary definition of the reserve factor) is no longer on that page, which was rewritten about a month before this read.Euler charges no protocol fee today; a supplier's cost is the vault-level interest fee a curator or governor sets. The Interest Rates page (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/interest-rates, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Euler does not currently charge protocol fees. In April 2026, Fee Flow was turned off and Euler protocol fees were set to 0% across live and future deployments. The DAO can reintroduce protocol fees through future governance." and "Curators and vault governors can still configure vault-level fees where supported by the vault. For EVK vaults, the interestFee parameter can allocate a portion of borrower interest to the configured fee receiver." It adds that "EVK interest fees are denominated in vault shares." Per-vault interestFee values are Data API fields, not page text, and vary by vault; supply and borrow rates float with each vault's own IRM, so no fixed APY is quoted.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
Custody modelEditorialNon-custodial: no company holds the coinsNon-custodial: no company holds the coins
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
VE
Venus
81#1 of 8
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Venus if oracle liquidation price matters most — it scores 9/10 to Euler V2's 7/10 there (weight 32).
Strength
Oracle liquidation price — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read https://docs-v4.venus.io/guides/isolated-pools-deprecation before you deposit - 'Venus isolated pools have been fully deprecated' - and then re-read the risk documentation knowing that. Almost everything Venus publishes about containing a loss automatically (the Shortfall auction, now paused - 'auctionsPaused() returned true' at a 27 Aug 2026 snapshot - and the healAccount write-off that 'records borrowBalance - actualRepayAmount as market badDebt') is scoped to those retired pools, and the risk-fund page, rewritten about a month before the 2026-09-28 read, says 'There is no universal on-chain function that automatically applies RiskFundV2 to every Venus bad-debt balance. Core Pool and isolated-pool accounting differ'. The FAQ still advertises isolated pools as preventing 'failures in one market from impacting others'. In practice a Core deficit is repaired only when governance votes to repair it from the Risk Fund - which it has done, twice, in full (VIP-564 2025-11-07, VIP-604 2026-03-30) - but that is a discretionary act, not a waterfall; the fund is on the order of 1% of Core debt, its balance is published nowhere, and the same page now calls it 'protocol-controlled funds allocated by governance; they are not a per-user insurance policy'. Second thing to read, and it is the one a leveraged holder underweights: the deprecation guide states that a missing price on any market in your position can block the exit - redeeming or calling exitMarket 'causes the Comptroller to check the account across all currently listed entered markets in that pool', and if the oracle 'still cannot produce a valid price for any required market, the operation can revert. exitMarket performs the same full-balance redeem check and generally cannot bypass that condition.' Third: the THE post-mortem concedes the published band did not stop the March 2026 attack - 'the BoundValidator reverted for approximately 37 minutes' and then accepted the manipulated price (THE carries the 1.05/0.95 band on the oracle table). The bounds are real, numeric and better disclosed than most of this pool, but they are a cross-source sanity check, not a manipulation-proof price.
Euler V2
77#4 of 8
Pick it when
Pick Euler V2 if blast radius matters most — it scores 9/10 to Venus's 7/10 there (weight 24).
Strength
Blast radius — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
VEVenusLeads
Choose Venus if oracle liquidation price matters most
Oracle liquidation price: 9/10 against 7/10 for Euler V2 (weight 32)
Rate authorship: 9/10 against 8/10 for Euler V2 (weight 24)
Shortfall record: 9/10 against 8/10 for Euler V2 (weight 20)
VenusScore 81A shared-pool onchain money market whose BNB Chain book is 99.5% of the protocol and where, for that book, Venus publishes per-market oracle tiers with numeric cross-source bounds and links each tier to its deployed oracle contract - while its own forum carries dated, quantified post-mortems of the four times it lost lender money, including admissions its docs never repeat.Strength: Oracle liquidation price — 9/10Watch-out: Read https://docs-v4.venus.io/guides/isolated-pools-deprecation before you deposit - 'Venus isolated pools have been fully deprecated' - and then re-read the risk documentation knowing that. Almost everything Venus publishes about containing a loss automatically (the Shortfall auction, now paused - 'auctionsPaused() returned true' at a 27 Aug 2026 snapshot - and the healAccount write-off that 'records borrowBalance - actualRepayAmount as market badDebt') is scoped to those retired pools, and the risk-fund page, rewritten about a month before the 2026-09-28 read, says 'There is no universal on-chain function that automatically applies RiskFundV2 to every Venus bad-debt balance. Core Pool and isolated-pool accounting differ'. The FAQ still advertises isolated pools as preventing 'failures in one market from impacting others'. In practice a Core deficit is repaired only when governance votes to repair it from the Risk Fund - which it has done, twice, in full (VIP-564 2025-11-07, VIP-604 2026-03-30) - but that is a discretionary act, not a waterfall; the fund is on the order of 1% of Core debt, its balance is published nowhere, and the same page now calls it 'protocol-controlled funds allocated by governance; they are not a per-user insurance policy'. Second thing to read, and it is the one a leveraged holder underweights: the deprecation guide states that a missing price on any market in your position can block the exit - redeeming or calling exitMarket 'causes the Comptroller to check the account across all currently listed entered markets in that pool', and if the oracle 'still cannot produce a valid price for any required market, the operation can revert. exitMarket performs the same full-balance redeem check and generally cannot bypass that condition.' Third: the THE post-mortem concedes the published band did not stop the March 2026 attack - 'the BoundValidator reverted for approximately 37 minutes' and then accepted the manipulated price (THE carries the 1.05/0.95 band on the oracle table). The bounds are real, numeric and better disclosed than most of this pool, but they are a cross-source sanity check, not a manipulation-proof price.
Euler V2
Choose Euler V2 if blast radius matters most
Blast radius: 9/10 against 7/10 for Venus (weight 24)
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Oracle liquidation price
by 2 of 10weight 7.7 of 86Venus leads
Venus9/10 out of 10
Euler V27/10 out of 10
Rate authorship
by 1 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Venus leads
Venus9/10 out of 10
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Blast radius
by 2 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Venus7/10 out of 10
Euler V29/10 out of 10
Shortfall record
by 1 of 10weight 4.8 of 86Venus leads
Venus9/10 out of 10
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Venus14/20Euler V214/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Venus20.4/30Euler V219/30
Venus leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Venus2.7/10Euler V22.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Venus3.2/8Euler V23.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Venus8.3/18Euler V28.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Venus unless the term Euler V2 leads on is the one you are buying.
Pick Euler V2 if blast radius matters most — it scores 9/10 to Venus's 7/10 there (weight 24).
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
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If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who sets your rate — a utilisation curve or a curator? · 24% (Venus 9/10, Euler V2 8/10)
Oracle failure: a wrong price or outcome liquidates or settles a position.
Scored by What price gets you liquidated, and how far can it drift? · 32% (Venus 9/10, Euler V2 7/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If one market goes bad, how much of yours goes with it? · 24% (Venus 7/10, Euler V2 9/10)
Scored by Has it lost lender money before, and did it publish it? · 20% (Venus 9/10, Euler V2 8/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Contract failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Exit failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Venus scores 4 points above Euler V2, led by oracle liquidation price, rate authorship, and shortfall record. Published scores, out of 100: Venus 81 (rank 1 of 8 lending & borrowing), Euler V2 77 (rank 4 of 8).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
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