Fluid (Instadapp) vs Aave Fluid (Instadapp) leads by 2 points.
Fluid (Instadapp) scores 2 points above Aave, led by blast radius. Fluid (Instadapp) ranks #7 and Aave #8 of 8 published lending & borrowing. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
Fluid (Instadapp)73
vs
AAAave71
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #7 and #8 of 8
Fluid (Instadapp) scores 2 points above Aave, led by blast radius.
Fluid (Instadapp) #7 of 873
AAAave #8 of 871
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termFluid (Instadapp) leads on 1 of 4 published criteria; Aave on 1. The terms sum to the gap.
TermFluid (Instadapp)AaveWeightPoints
Blast radius8/106/105.8+3.0for Fluid (Instadapp)+1.5 of 32
Rate authorship8/109/105.8−1.5for Aave−0.8 of 32
Net of the terms+1.5
Criteria roundingThe criteria block is rounded to whole points before it is spread+0.1
Reproduced gap+1.6
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7371+2.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
Fluid (Instadapp)Score 73Shared-liquidity money market where collateral and debt can sit inside a Fluid DEX position; publishes per-vault oracle contract, LTV, liquidation threshold, penalty and absorbed bad debt live via its own API, and disclosed a ~$21M Resolv-driven shortfall (incident 22 Mar 2026) on its governance forum in amounts its own marketing recap then restates as $9.7M and attributes to the wrong payer.Strength: Rate authorship — 8/10Watch-out: Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.AaveScore 71The reference shared-pool money market: it publishes the loss waterfall, the risk-steward mandate and its own incident arithmetic in more detail than anyone in the category, and publishes no deviation threshold or heartbeat anywhere for the price that actually liquidates you.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Quick facts
At a glance
3 of 4 rows read the same for both.
FactFluid (Instadapp)Aave
PricingSnapshotFluid's guides publish no fee schedule for lenders or borrowers; the costs are the floating rate and, if liquidated, a per-vault liquidation penalty. The Liquidity Layer page (https://fluid.guides.instadapp.io/liquidity-layer/unifying-liquidity, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Fluid boasts the most advanced liquidation mechanisms, with penalties as low as 0.1%." The live penalties and rates are API fields, not page text: https://api.fluid.instadapp.io/v2/borrowing/1/vaults on 28 September 2026 returned liquidationPenalty 10 basis points (the 0.1% floor) on the wstETH/ETH vault (id 13) and 100 basis points on the ETH/USDC (id 11) and ETH/USDT (id 12) vaults, with borrow rates of 243, 584 and 567 basis points and a vault feeRate of 0 on all three. Rates float with utilisation, so no fixed APY is quoted.Aave charges no deposit or curator fee; suppliers earn borrower interest net of each reserve's reserve factor, and both rates float on a two-slope utilisation curve. The Interest Rate Strategy page (https://aave.com/docs/aave-v3/smart-contracts/interest-rate-strategy, fetched 28 September 2026): "Implements the calculation of the interest rates depending on the reserve state. The model of interest rate is based on two slopes" around the OPTIMAL_USAGE_RATIO kink. Aave's docs carry no live values (https://aave.com/docs/resources/parameters still shows only an SDK pointer); the numbers are published per change on the governance forum. LlamaRisk's Risk Steward post of 28 September 2026 (https://governance.aave.com/t/risk-stewards-cap-and-irm-changes-on-aave-v3-2026-09-28/25718) gives USDT on Aave V3 Core: "At the current 92.8% utilization, the post-change variable borrow rate would be 4.34% APR, down from 4.39% under the current IRM, and the supply rate would be 3.63% APR, down from 3.67%." It also states the protocol's take on one asset: "the 25% reserve factor that applies to USDe on all five reserves". Rates reprice every block with utilisation; these are point-in-time figures, not a quote.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
Custody modelEditorialNon-custodial: no company holds the coinsNon-custodial: no company holds the coins
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
Fluid (Instadapp)
73#7 of 8
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Fluid (Instadapp) if blast radius matters most — it scores 8/10 to Aave's 6/10 there (weight 24).
Strength
Rate authorship — 8/10
Tradeoff
Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.
AA
Aave
71#8 of 8
Pick it when
Pick Aave if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Fluid (Instadapp)'s 8/10 there (weight 24).
Strength
Rate authorship — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
Fluid (Instadapp)Leads
Choose Fluid (Instadapp) if blast radius matters most
Blast radius: 8/10 against 6/10 for Aave (weight 24)
Fluid (Instadapp)Score 73Shared-liquidity money market where collateral and debt can sit inside a Fluid DEX position; publishes per-vault oracle contract, LTV, liquidation threshold, penalty and absorbed bad debt live via its own API, and disclosed a ~$21M Resolv-driven shortfall (incident 22 Mar 2026) on its governance forum in amounts its own marketing recap then restates as $9.7M and attributes to the wrong payer.Strength: Rate authorship — 8/10Watch-out: Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.
AAAave
Choose Aave if rate authorship matters most
Rate authorship: 9/10 against 8/10 for Fluid (Instadapp) (weight 24)
AaveScore 71The reference shared-pool money market: it publishes the loss waterfall, the risk-steward mandate and its own incident arithmetic in more detail than anyone in the category, and publishes no deviation threshold or heartbeat anywhere for the price that actually liquidates you.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Oracle liquidation price
weight 7.7 of 86Tie
Fluid (Instadapp)6/10 out of 10
Aave6/10 out of 10
Rate authorship
by 1 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Aave leads
Fluid (Instadapp)8/10 out of 10
Aave9/10 out of 10
Blast radius
by 2 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Fluid (Instadapp) leads
Fluid (Instadapp)8/10 out of 10
Aave6/10 out of 10
Shortfall record
weight 4.8 of 86Tie
Fluid (Instadapp)7/10 out of 10
Aave7/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Fluid (Instadapp)14/20Aave14/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Fluid (Instadapp)17.2/30Aave16.6/30
Fluid (Instadapp) leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Fluid (Instadapp)2.7/10Aave2.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Fluid (Instadapp)3.2/8Aave3.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Fluid (Instadapp)8.3/18Aave8.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Fluid (Instadapp) unless the term Aave leads on is the one you are buying.
Pick Aave if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Fluid (Instadapp)'s 8/10 there (weight 24).
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
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If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who sets your rate — a utilisation curve or a curator? · 24% (Fluid (Instadapp) 8/10, Aave 9/10)
Oracle failure: a wrong price or outcome liquidates or settles a position.
Scored by What price gets you liquidated, and how far can it drift? · 32% (Fluid (Instadapp) 6/10, Aave 6/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If one market goes bad, how much of yours goes with it? · 24% (Fluid (Instadapp) 8/10, Aave 6/10)
Scored by Has it lost lender money before, and did it publish it? · 20% (Fluid (Instadapp) 7/10, Aave 7/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Contract failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Exit failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Fluid (Instadapp) scores 2 points above Aave, led by blast radius. Published scores, out of 100: Fluid (Instadapp) 73 (rank 7 of 8 lending & borrowing), Aave 71 (rank 8 of 8).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
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