Kiln scores 7 points above Figment, led by slashing cover, lock-up disclosure, and voting from custody. Figment ranks #4 and Kiln #1 of 7 published staking. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
FIFigment72
vs
Kiln79
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #4 and #1 of 7
Kiln scores 7 points above Figment, led by slashing cover, lock-up disclosure, and voting from custody.
FIFigment #4 of 772
Kiln #1 of 779
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termKiln leads on 3 of 4 published criteria; Figment on 0. The terms sum to the gap.
TermKilnFigmentWeightPoints
Slashing cover6/105/108.2+2.1for Kiln+1.1 of 32
Lock-up disclosure8/106/105.3+2.7for Kiln+1.4 of 32
Voting from custody7/105/104.8+2.5for Kiln+1.3 of 32
Net of the terms+7.4
Criteria roundingThe criteria block is rounded to whole points before it is spread−0.1
Reproduced gap+7.3
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7972+7.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
KilnScore 79The white-label validator operator running under other firms' staking buttons, with 15 named custody-platform integration guides and a per-network lock-up figure published across 26 protocol docs pages (2026-09-28 count) — but a slashing base layer whose size it has never quantified, a commission printed for only two of those 26 networks, and a governance posture stated for two niche products while the Cosmos-family chains where delegated stake actually votes are left silent.Strength: Unbonding disclosure — 8/10Watch-out: Read all three parts of the September 2025 breach disclosure before you sign, and then ask for the base slashing coverage limit in writing. Kiln itself names the victim. (1) https://www.kiln.fi/post/sol-incident-swissborg---announcement, September 8, 2025: "SwissBorg and Kiln are investigating an incident that may have involved unauthorized access to a wallet used for staking operations... The incident resulted in Solana funds being improperly removed from the wallet used for staking operations." (2) https://www.kiln.fi/kiln-responds-tot-infrastructure-issue-with-validator-exit-funds-remain-protected, "PARIS, FRANCE — September 9, 2025": "Kiln today began the orderly exit of all of its Ethereum (ETH) validators", and "The exit process is expected to take between 10 and 30 days depending on the validator" — an operator-side security event that put every ETH client's principal into a multi-week forced exit, which no unbonding table warns you about. (3) The post-mortem at https://www.kiln.fi/post/re-enablement-of-kiln-services-and-security-incident-information, October 7, 2025: a threat actor compromised "a GitHub access token belonging to a Kiln infrastructure engineer", harvested cloud credentials via CI workflows, and "modified the Kiln Connect API backend controller to return a malicious transaction, which one Kiln enterprise customer signed in their custody solution, causing a loss of funds." The malicious transaction "changed the withdrawal authority of the Solana stakes, only if the existing withdrawal authority of the stake account provided in the POST call held stake balances above 150k SOL" — targeted at the largest clients, and the customer's own quorum approved it inside their custody instance. NOTE THE DIVERGENT ATTRIBUTION, which is the single most useful thing here: Kiln places the mitigation duty on the client — "Kiln has consistently recommended that customers decode transactions to verify their integrity before signing", and "Signing and broadcasting a transaction without decoding may result in a loss of authority over stake accounts, as occurred in this case" — while SwissBorg's own primary statement (https://swissborg.com/blog/swissborg-security-update-kiln-breach) puts it on Kiln: "the tampering of the transaction happened within Kiln's infrastructure", and states "no breach occurred within SwissBorg's infrastructure", quantifying the loss at "over 192,000 SOL". The lesson for this category is precise: non-custody protected the keys but not the client, because the attack came through the transaction the operator constructed, and it was not a slashing event — so the Chainproof base layer, whose size Kiln has never published, would not obviously have answered it. Ask for the base coverage limit, what perils it covers beyond slashing, and whether the operator or the client bears an API-origin malicious-transaction loss. Get it in the contract; Kiln's own institutional docs tell you to, saying "For more details and Kiln's coverage please read our T&Cs or the Order Form you have signed with Kiln."FigmentScore 72Institutional non-custodial validator operator publishing a 25-network catalog table (2026-09-28 count) with per-network unbonding and 28 named custody integrations, whose only public price is an Ethereum self-serve app fee stated as "10% of total rewards" in an answer that first scopes it to execution-layer rewards, while the institutional contract rate, and the size of its slashing coverage, are both set behind "Meet With Us".Strength: Unbonding disclosure — 6/10Watch-out: The number you would actually pay is not on this site, and the one number that is on it does not say what it is charged on. Figment's only stated fee is the Ethereum self-serve app's, on https://www.figment.io/products/staking-app/ : you "only pay a service fee when your validator is selected to propose a block and earns execution layer rewards", and then "Currently, the service fee is 10% of total rewards, but is subject to change." — so the page does not say whether the 10% is taken on execution-layer or on total rewards. The second, conflicting rate (30% of execution layer rewards) that https://www.figment.io/staking/protocols/ethereum/ printed in August was gone from that page on 2026-09-28. The 10% describes the ETH self-serve app, not an institutional rate, and the institutional pages print no fee at all. Do not mistake the "Avg. Public Node Fee" column on the protocols catalog for Figment's price — it is undefined on the page, and its Ethereum cell, "Varies" in August, read "10%" on 2026-09-28, matching the app fee without saying it is one, so treat it as an undefined benchmark, not a quote. The coverage that reads like indemnity is unquantified the same way: the only insurer Figment names, Nexus Mutual, is an opt-in purchase limited to Ethereum double-sign; the "multi-tiered coverage, including insurance and Figment's balance sheet" on the solutions pages carries no limit and no basis; and the one thing Figment says it "contractually commit[s]" to is slashing ALERTING, not reimbursement. Before committing, make the contract state (a) your actual commission and its base per network, and (b) the coverage limit in figures and who underwrites it — because on the public record neither exists.
Quick facts
At a glance
2 of 3 rows read the same for both.
FactFigmentKiln
PricingSnapshotFigment app FAQ "How much does it cost to stake through the Figment app?" on https://www.figment.io/products/staking-app/ (fetched 28 September 2026): "You keep all of the consensus layer rewards earned by your validator when staking through the Figment app and only pay a service fee when your validator is selected to propose a block and earns execution layer rewards. This fee is collected on-chain automatically through a smart contract. Currently, the service fee is 10% of total rewards, but is subject to change." That is the Ethereum self-serve app rate; the sentence scopes the fee to execution-layer rewards and then states it as a share of total rewards, and the page does not say which reading governs. It is not an institutional contract rate: the custodian and asset-manager solution pages print no fee and route to "Meet With Us", and the Staking Terms of Use (Last Updated August 21st, 2026) say only that service fees "are publicly available on the relevant block explorer for each Supported Blockchain and are subject to change at any time for any reason."Kiln validator docs page "Solana (SOL)" (https://docs.kiln.fi/v1/kiln-products/validators/protocols/solana-sol, fetched 28 September 2026), Mainnet table with columns Name | Commission | MEV commission | Address: Kiln1 — "5%" commission, "100% (offchain rebates & compounding)" MEV commission, vote account DdCNGDpP7qMgoAy6paFzhhak2EeyCZcgjH7ak5u5v28m; Kiln2 — "7%" commission, "7%" MEV commission, vote account HCvnhbT3Sn5RsueDisWzzn5FkW8tAqoQK1dr7cvAVzin. The same page adds: "Each validator commission rate is public and the same for all funds on a given validator. The validator takes its commission automatically when rewards are generated. Your staking rewards are distributed net of the validator commission." These are Solana validator rates only. Of the 26 validator protocol pages Kiln documents, only this page and the NEAR page print a commission figure, https://www.kiln.fi/pricing returns 404, and no institutional contract rate is published.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
FI
Figment
72#4 of 7
Pick it when
Figment leads Kiln on no published criterion and no score dimension — pick it only if a fact outside the score (country, funding rail, custody) decides for you.
Strength
Unbonding disclosure — 6/10
Tradeoff
The number you would actually pay is not on this site, and the one number that is on it does not say what it is charged on. Figment's only stated fee is the Ethereum self-serve app's, on https://www.figment.io/products/staking-app/ : you "only pay a service fee when your validator is selected to propose a block and earns execution layer rewards", and then "Currently, the service fee is 10% of total rewards, but is subject to change." — so the page does not say whether the 10% is taken on execution-layer or on total rewards. The second, conflicting rate (30% of execution layer rewards) that https://www.figment.io/staking/protocols/ethereum/ printed in August was gone from that page on 2026-09-28. The 10% describes the ETH self-serve app, not an institutional rate, and the institutional pages print no fee at all. Do not mistake the "Avg. Public Node Fee" column on the protocols catalog for Figment's price — it is undefined on the page, and its Ethereum cell, "Varies" in August, read "10%" on 2026-09-28, matching the app fee without saying it is one, so treat it as an undefined benchmark, not a quote. The coverage that reads like indemnity is unquantified the same way: the only insurer Figment names, Nexus Mutual, is an opt-in purchase limited to Ethereum double-sign; the "multi-tiered coverage, including insurance and Figment's balance sheet" on the solutions pages carries no limit and no basis; and the one thing Figment says it "contractually commit[s]" to is slashing ALERTING, not reimbursement. Before committing, make the contract state (a) your actual commission and its base per network, and (b) the coverage limit in figures and who underwrites it — because on the public record neither exists.
Kiln
79#1 of 7
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Kiln if slashing cover matters most — it scores 6/10 to Figment's 5/10 there (weight 34).
Strength
Unbonding disclosure — 8/10
Tradeoff
Read all three parts of the September 2025 breach disclosure before you sign, and then ask for the base slashing coverage limit in writing. Kiln itself names the victim. (1) https://www.kiln.fi/post/sol-incident-swissborg---announcement, September 8, 2025: "SwissBorg and Kiln are investigating an incident that may have involved unauthorized access to a wallet used for staking operations... The incident resulted in Solana funds being improperly removed from the wallet used for staking operations." (2) https://www.kiln.fi/kiln-responds-tot-infrastructure-issue-with-validator-exit-funds-remain-protected, "PARIS, FRANCE — September 9, 2025": "Kiln today began the orderly exit of all of its Ethereum (ETH) validators", and "The exit process is expected to take between 10 and 30 days depending on the validator" — an operator-side security event that put every ETH client's principal into a multi-week forced exit, which no unbonding table warns you about. (3) The post-mortem at https://www.kiln.fi/post/re-enablement-of-kiln-services-and-security-incident-information, October 7, 2025: a threat actor compromised "a GitHub access token belonging to a Kiln infrastructure engineer", harvested cloud credentials via CI workflows, and "modified the Kiln Connect API backend controller to return a malicious transaction, which one Kiln enterprise customer signed in their custody solution, causing a loss of funds." The malicious transaction "changed the withdrawal authority of the Solana stakes, only if the existing withdrawal authority of the stake account provided in the POST call held stake balances above 150k SOL" — targeted at the largest clients, and the customer's own quorum approved it inside their custody instance. NOTE THE DIVERGENT ATTRIBUTION, which is the single most useful thing here: Kiln places the mitigation duty on the client — "Kiln has consistently recommended that customers decode transactions to verify their integrity before signing", and "Signing and broadcasting a transaction without decoding may result in a loss of authority over stake accounts, as occurred in this case" — while SwissBorg's own primary statement (https://swissborg.com/blog/swissborg-security-update-kiln-breach) puts it on Kiln: "the tampering of the transaction happened within Kiln's infrastructure", and states "no breach occurred within SwissBorg's infrastructure", quantifying the loss at "over 192,000 SOL". The lesson for this category is precise: non-custody protected the keys but not the client, because the attack came through the transaction the operator constructed, and it was not a slashing event — so the Chainproof base layer, whose size Kiln has never published, would not obviously have answered it. Ask for the base coverage limit, what perils it covers beyond slashing, and whether the operator or the client bears an API-origin malicious-transaction loss. Get it in the contract; Kiln's own institutional docs tell you to, saying "For more details and Kiln's coverage please read our T&Cs or the Order Form you have signed with Kiln."
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
FIFigment
Figment leads Kiln on no published criterion
Choose it only if something outside the published criteria decides for you — your country, a funding rail, or custody.
FigmentScore 72Institutional non-custodial validator operator publishing a 25-network catalog table (2026-09-28 count) with per-network unbonding and 28 named custody integrations, whose only public price is an Ethereum self-serve app fee stated as "10% of total rewards" in an answer that first scopes it to execution-layer rewards, while the institutional contract rate, and the size of its slashing coverage, are both set behind "Meet With Us".Strength: Unbonding disclosure — 6/10Watch-out: The number you would actually pay is not on this site, and the one number that is on it does not say what it is charged on. Figment's only stated fee is the Ethereum self-serve app's, on https://www.figment.io/products/staking-app/ : you "only pay a service fee when your validator is selected to propose a block and earns execution layer rewards", and then "Currently, the service fee is 10% of total rewards, but is subject to change." — so the page does not say whether the 10% is taken on execution-layer or on total rewards. The second, conflicting rate (30% of execution layer rewards) that https://www.figment.io/staking/protocols/ethereum/ printed in August was gone from that page on 2026-09-28. The 10% describes the ETH self-serve app, not an institutional rate, and the institutional pages print no fee at all. Do not mistake the "Avg. Public Node Fee" column on the protocols catalog for Figment's price — it is undefined on the page, and its Ethereum cell, "Varies" in August, read "10%" on 2026-09-28, matching the app fee without saying it is one, so treat it as an undefined benchmark, not a quote. The coverage that reads like indemnity is unquantified the same way: the only insurer Figment names, Nexus Mutual, is an opt-in purchase limited to Ethereum double-sign; the "multi-tiered coverage, including insurance and Figment's balance sheet" on the solutions pages carries no limit and no basis; and the one thing Figment says it "contractually commit[s]" to is slashing ALERTING, not reimbursement. Before committing, make the contract state (a) your actual commission and its base per network, and (b) the coverage limit in figures and who underwrites it — because on the public record neither exists.
KilnLeads
Choose Kiln if slashing cover matters most
Slashing cover: 6/10 against 5/10 for Figment (weight 34)
Lock-up disclosure: 8/10 against 6/10 for Figment (weight 22)
Voting from custody: 7/10 against 5/10 for Figment (weight 20)
KilnScore 79The white-label validator operator running under other firms' staking buttons, with 15 named custody-platform integration guides and a per-network lock-up figure published across 26 protocol docs pages (2026-09-28 count) — but a slashing base layer whose size it has never quantified, a commission printed for only two of those 26 networks, and a governance posture stated for two niche products while the Cosmos-family chains where delegated stake actually votes are left silent.Strength: Unbonding disclosure — 8/10Watch-out: Read all three parts of the September 2025 breach disclosure before you sign, and then ask for the base slashing coverage limit in writing. Kiln itself names the victim. (1) https://www.kiln.fi/post/sol-incident-swissborg---announcement, September 8, 2025: "SwissBorg and Kiln are investigating an incident that may have involved unauthorized access to a wallet used for staking operations... The incident resulted in Solana funds being improperly removed from the wallet used for staking operations." (2) https://www.kiln.fi/kiln-responds-tot-infrastructure-issue-with-validator-exit-funds-remain-protected, "PARIS, FRANCE — September 9, 2025": "Kiln today began the orderly exit of all of its Ethereum (ETH) validators", and "The exit process is expected to take between 10 and 30 days depending on the validator" — an operator-side security event that put every ETH client's principal into a multi-week forced exit, which no unbonding table warns you about. (3) The post-mortem at https://www.kiln.fi/post/re-enablement-of-kiln-services-and-security-incident-information, October 7, 2025: a threat actor compromised "a GitHub access token belonging to a Kiln infrastructure engineer", harvested cloud credentials via CI workflows, and "modified the Kiln Connect API backend controller to return a malicious transaction, which one Kiln enterprise customer signed in their custody solution, causing a loss of funds." The malicious transaction "changed the withdrawal authority of the Solana stakes, only if the existing withdrawal authority of the stake account provided in the POST call held stake balances above 150k SOL" — targeted at the largest clients, and the customer's own quorum approved it inside their custody instance. NOTE THE DIVERGENT ATTRIBUTION, which is the single most useful thing here: Kiln places the mitigation duty on the client — "Kiln has consistently recommended that customers decode transactions to verify their integrity before signing", and "Signing and broadcasting a transaction without decoding may result in a loss of authority over stake accounts, as occurred in this case" — while SwissBorg's own primary statement (https://swissborg.com/blog/swissborg-security-update-kiln-breach) puts it on Kiln: "the tampering of the transaction happened within Kiln's infrastructure", and states "no breach occurred within SwissBorg's infrastructure", quantifying the loss at "over 192,000 SOL". The lesson for this category is precise: non-custody protected the keys but not the client, because the attack came through the transaction the operator constructed, and it was not a slashing event — so the Chainproof base layer, whose size Kiln has never published, would not obviously have answered it. Ask for the base coverage limit, what perils it covers beyond slashing, and whether the operator or the client bears an API-origin malicious-transaction loss. Get it in the contract; Kiln's own institutional docs tell you to, saying "For more details and Kiln's coverage please read our T&Cs or the Order Form you have signed with Kiln."
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Slashing cover
by 1 of 10weight 8.2 of 86Kiln leads
Figment5/10 out of 10
Kiln6/10 out of 10
Lock-up disclosure
by 2 of 10weight 5.3 of 86Kiln leads
Figment6/10 out of 10
Kiln8/10 out of 10
Rate transparency
weight 5.8 of 86Tie
Figment6/10 out of 10
Kiln6/10 out of 10
Voting from custody
by 2 of 10weight 4.8 of 86Kiln leads
Figment5/10 out of 10
Kiln7/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Figment14/20Kiln14/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Figment13.1/30Kiln15.9/30
Kiln leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Figment2.7/10Kiln2.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Figment3.2/8Kiln3.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Figment8.3/18Kiln8.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Kiln unless the term Figment leads on is the one you are buying.
Figment leads Kiln on no published criterion and no score dimension — pick it only if a fact outside the score (country, funding rail, custody) decides for you.
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
Next best action
If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Do you keep custody and still get to vote — and who presses the button? · 20% (Figment 5/10, Kiln 7/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If a validator you delegated to gets slashed, who actually writes the cheque? · 34% (Figment 5/10, Kiln 6/10)
Exit failure: you cannot get out at par, on time, or with what is yours.
Scored by How long are the assets locked per network, and did they tell you before you signed? · 22% (Figment 6/10, Kiln 8/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Liveness failure, Custody failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Information failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Also scored, as cost, quality or a summary of several families: Can you find the rate you would actually pay without booking a sales call? (24%).
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Kiln scores 7 points above Figment, led by slashing cover, lock-up disclosure, and voting from custody. Published scores, out of 100: Figment 72 (rank 4 of 7 staking), Kiln 79 (rank 1 of 7).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
Answer a few quick questions and get one clear recommendation based on how you actually plan to use crypto — with rationale, tradeoffs, and a path to monitor the decision.
No signup·Free first pass · Private·No spam · No account
Not financial advice · Independent · Always do your own research
Not financial advice · For informational purposes only · Always do your own research
Kiln #1 of 779