Euler V2 vs Fluid (Instadapp) Euler V2 leads by 4 points.
Euler V2 scores 4 points above Fluid (Instadapp), led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record. Euler V2 ranks #4 and Fluid (Instadapp) #7 of 8 published lending & borrowing. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
Euler V277
vs
Fluid (Instadapp)73
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #4 and #7 of 8
Euler V2 scores 4 points above Fluid (Instadapp), led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record.
Euler V2 #4 of 877
Fluid (Instadapp) #7 of 873
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termEuler V2 leads on 3 of 4 published criteria; Fluid (Instadapp) on 0. The terms sum to the gap.
TermEuler V2Fluid (Instadapp)WeightPoints
Oracle liquidation price7/106/107.7+2.0for Euler V2+1.0 of 32
Blast radius9/108/105.8+1.5for Euler V2+0.8 of 32
Shortfall record8/107/104.8+1.2for Euler V2+0.6 of 32
Net of the terms+4.7
Criteria roundingThe criteria block is rounded to whole points before it is spread−0.1
Reproduced gap+4.7
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7773+4.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.Fluid (Instadapp)Score 73Shared-liquidity money market where collateral and debt can sit inside a Fluid DEX position; publishes per-vault oracle contract, LTV, liquidation threshold, penalty and absorbed bad debt live via its own API, and disclosed a ~$21M Resolv-driven shortfall (incident 22 Mar 2026) on its governance forum in amounts its own marketing recap then restates as $9.7M and attributes to the wrong payer.Strength: Rate authorship — 8/10Watch-out: Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.
Quick facts
At a glance
3 of 4 rows read the same for both.
FactEuler V2Fluid (Instadapp)
PricingSnapshotEuler charges no protocol fee today; a supplier's cost is the vault-level interest fee a curator or governor sets. The Interest Rates page (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/interest-rates, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Euler does not currently charge protocol fees. In April 2026, Fee Flow was turned off and Euler protocol fees were set to 0% across live and future deployments. The DAO can reintroduce protocol fees through future governance." and "Curators and vault governors can still configure vault-level fees where supported by the vault. For EVK vaults, the interestFee parameter can allocate a portion of borrower interest to the configured fee receiver." It adds that "EVK interest fees are denominated in vault shares." Per-vault interestFee values are Data API fields, not page text, and vary by vault; supply and borrow rates float with each vault's own IRM, so no fixed APY is quoted.Fluid's guides publish no fee schedule for lenders or borrowers; the costs are the floating rate and, if liquidated, a per-vault liquidation penalty. The Liquidity Layer page (https://fluid.guides.instadapp.io/liquidity-layer/unifying-liquidity, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Fluid boasts the most advanced liquidation mechanisms, with penalties as low as 0.1%." The live penalties and rates are API fields, not page text: https://api.fluid.instadapp.io/v2/borrowing/1/vaults on 28 September 2026 returned liquidationPenalty 10 basis points (the 0.1% floor) on the wstETH/ETH vault (id 13) and 100 basis points on the ETH/USDC (id 11) and ETH/USDT (id 12) vaults, with borrow rates of 243, 584 and 567 basis points and a vault feeRate of 0 on all three. Rates float with utilisation, so no fixed APY is quoted.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
Custody modelEditorialNon-custodial: no company holds the coinsNon-custodial: no company holds the coins
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
Euler V2
77#4 of 8
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most — it scores 7/10 to Fluid (Instadapp)'s 6/10 there (weight 32).
Strength
Blast radius — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Fluid (Instadapp)
73#7 of 8
Pick it when
Fluid (Instadapp) leads Euler V2 on no published criterion and no score dimension — pick it only if a fact outside the score (country, funding rail, custody) decides for you.
Strength
Rate authorship — 8/10
Tradeoff
Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
Euler V2Leads
Choose Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most
Oracle liquidation price: 7/10 against 6/10 for Fluid (Instadapp) (weight 32)
Blast radius: 9/10 against 8/10 for Fluid (Instadapp) (weight 24)
Shortfall record: 8/10 against 7/10 for Fluid (Instadapp) (weight 20)
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Fluid (Instadapp)
Fluid (Instadapp) leads Euler V2 on no published criterion
Choose it only if something outside the published criteria decides for you — your country, a funding rail, or custody.
Fluid (Instadapp)Score 73Shared-liquidity money market where collateral and debt can sit inside a Fluid DEX position; publishes per-vault oracle contract, LTV, liquidation threshold, penalty and absorbed bad debt live via its own API, and disclosed a ~$21M Resolv-driven shortfall (incident 22 Mar 2026) on its governance forum in amounts its own marketing recap then restates as $9.7M and attributes to the wrong payer.Strength: Rate authorship — 8/10Watch-out: Read the Resolv post-mortem on the governance forum, not the recap on the blog — they do not agree, and each omits what the other has. https://gov.fluid.io/t/post-mortem-treasury-actions-and-forward-strategy-following-resolv-incident/1774 (11 May 2026) states 'Fluid incurred ~$21M in bad debt due to the Resolv incident' and splits the remaining ~$19.3M as ~$9.7M Resolv / ~$8.2M Fluid governance treasury / ~$1.5M team, but never dates the event. The H1 2026 recap on fluid.io (5 Aug 2026) dates it — 'On March 22nd, a malicious actor gained unauthorized access to Resolv's signing infrastructure, minting approximately $80M of uncollateralized USR' — then restates the loss as 'The resulting shortfall — about $9.7M, or roughly 10% of total exposure — was covered directly from the DAO treasury.' That figure is Resolv's share presented as the whole loss and attributed to the wrong payer, at under half the number Fluid gave its own DAO. The mechanism that produced it is still the one you are underwriting: Fluid's own risk page says the oracle takes a Uniswap TWAP, runs a 'difference check' against Chainlink and falls back 'If the TWAP is within parameters' without ever stating what those parameters are; 'heartbeat' appears on none of the 46 pages of Fluid's buyer-facing GitBook and only as an unvalued rebalance condition in its autogenerated contract docs; and the one numeric deviation figure Fluid has published — 'revert all operates if deviation > 2%' — is by its own wording operate-only and therefore does not constrain the price that liquidates you.
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Oracle liquidation price
by 1 of 10weight 7.7 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V27/10 out of 10
Fluid (Instadapp)6/10 out of 10
Rate authorship
weight 5.8 of 86Tie
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Fluid (Instadapp)8/10 out of 10
Blast radius
by 1 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V29/10 out of 10
Fluid (Instadapp)8/10 out of 10
Shortfall record
by 1 of 10weight 4.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Fluid (Instadapp)7/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Euler V214/20Fluid (Instadapp)14/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Euler V219/30Fluid (Instadapp)17.2/30
Euler V2 leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Euler V22.7/10Fluid (Instadapp)2.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Euler V23.2/8Fluid (Instadapp)3.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Euler V28.3/18Fluid (Instadapp)8.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Euler V2 unless the term Fluid (Instadapp) leads on is the one you are buying.
Fluid (Instadapp) leads Euler V2 on no published criterion and no score dimension — pick it only if a fact outside the score (country, funding rail, custody) decides for you.
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
Next best action
If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who sets your rate — a utilisation curve or a curator? · 24% (Euler V2 8/10, Fluid (Instadapp) 8/10)
Oracle failure: a wrong price or outcome liquidates or settles a position.
Scored by What price gets you liquidated, and how far can it drift? · 32% (Euler V2 7/10, Fluid (Instadapp) 6/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If one market goes bad, how much of yours goes with it? · 24% (Euler V2 9/10, Fluid (Instadapp) 8/10)
Scored by Has it lost lender money before, and did it publish it? · 20% (Euler V2 8/10, Fluid (Instadapp) 7/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Contract failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Exit failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Euler V2 scores 4 points above Fluid (Instadapp), led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record. Published scores, out of 100: Euler V2 77 (rank 4 of 8 lending & borrowing), Fluid (Instadapp) 73 (rank 7 of 8).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
Answer a few quick questions and get one clear recommendation based on how you actually plan to use crypto — with rationale, tradeoffs, and a path to monitor the decision.
No signup·Free first pass · Private·No spam · No account
Not financial advice · Independent · Always do your own research
Not financial advice · For informational purposes only · Always do your own research
