Euler V2 scores 3 points above Compound, led by oracle liquidation price and blast radius. Euler V2 ranks #4 and Compound #6 of 8 published lending & borrowing. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
Euler V277
vs
Compound74
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #4 and #6 of 8
Euler V2 scores 3 points above Compound, led by oracle liquidation price and blast radius.
Euler V2 #4 of 877
Compound #6 of 874
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termEuler V2 leads on 2 of 4 published criteria; Compound on 1. The terms sum to the gap.
TermEuler V2CompoundWeightPoints
Oracle liquidation price7/106/107.7+2.0for Euler V2+1.0 of 32
Blast radius9/107/105.8+3.0for Euler V2+1.5 of 32
Rate authorship8/109/105.8−1.5for Compound−0.8 of 32
Net of the terms+3.5
Criteria roundingThe criteria block is rounded to whole points before it is spread−0.1
Reproduced gap+3.4
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7774+3.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.CompoundScore 74COMP-governed onchain money market whose Compound III (Comet) design gives each market exactly one borrowable base asset and a set of capped, non-lent collateral assets, priced by a single named Chainlink feed per asset with no published deviation bound, and liquidated whole by an absorb call paid out of protocol reserves.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Compound now has one of the cleanest RATE disclosures in this pool and one of the thinnest ORACLE disclosures, and a buyer who conflates the two will misprice it. Four specific traps. First, the page that tells you what liquidates you — https://docs.compound.finance/liquidation/ — never names an oracle at all ("This function uses the price returned by the protocol’s price feed"); Chainlink is named two clicks away on the helper-functions page, and a machine check of all nine Compound doc pages returns zero occurrences of deviation, heartbeat, staleness, median, fallback, killswitch or price bound. The one bounded feed Compound ever ran — the multisig-settable min/max and constant-price override added to rsETH after the 18 April 2026 Kelp bridge exploit — was REVERTED in May 2026 via Proposal 586, so as of today no Compound market carries a numeric price bound. Second, the docs registry is a snapshot, not live state: stamped 2026-02-28, it still advertises rsETH on the Ethereum USDC Comet at 85% borrow CF and a 1,500-token supply cap when the on-chain cap has since been set to 0, and it still lists ten mainnet networks when six of them — Polygon, Unichain, Linea, Mantle, Ronin and Scroll — are approved for deprecation with supply caps zeroed, collateral factors halved and supply rates being set to 0%. Read the Comet and the forum, not the docs table. Third, the one-week governance timelock that makes Compound's rate authorship trustworthy does NOT cover the emergency path: the Community Multi-Sig pause guardian can freeze withdrawals instantly (it did so across six networks in April 2026), and a 0% collateral factor mechanically locks collateral until debt is fully repaid — both disclosed on the forum, neither in the docs. Fourth, the named backstop is real but shrinking and undocumented at the tail: reserves on the Ethereum WETH Comet fell from 921.22 to 908.46 WETH between 10 May and 5 August 2026 because the comet "retains none of the interest borrowers pay at its optimal utilization", no Compound page says what happens once reserves are exhausted, and Compound discloses its losses well on comp.xyz and not at all on either page titled Security.
Quick facts
At a glance
3 of 4 rows read the same for both.
FactEuler V2Compound
PricingSnapshotEuler charges no protocol fee today; a supplier's cost is the vault-level interest fee a curator or governor sets. The Interest Rates page (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/interest-rates, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Euler does not currently charge protocol fees. In April 2026, Fee Flow was turned off and Euler protocol fees were set to 0% across live and future deployments. The DAO can reintroduce protocol fees through future governance." and "Curators and vault governors can still configure vault-level fees where supported by the vault. For EVK vaults, the interestFee parameter can allocate a portion of borrower interest to the configured fee receiver." It adds that "EVK interest fees are denominated in vault shares." Per-vault interestFee values are Data API fields, not page text, and vary by vault; supply and borrow rates float with each vault's own IRM, so no fixed APY is quoted.Compound III charges no subscription, listing or curator fee; the protocol's take is the spread between separate supply and borrow curves that governance sets. The Interest Rates page (https://docs.compound.finance/interest-rates/, fetched 28 September 2026): "Users with a positive balance of the base asset earn interest, denominated in the base asset, based on a supply rate model; users with a negative balance pay interest based on a borrow rate model. These are separate interest rate models, and set by governance." Compound publishes the size of that spread only per proposal on its forum. For the Ethereum WETH Comet, Gauntlet's 5 August 2026 post (https://www.comp.xyz/t/ethereum-weth-comet-borrow-rate-irm-updates/7999, fetched 28 September 2026) states "Compound v3 has no reserve factor parameter" and prints the implied reserve factor as "0.00%" at the kink and "10.00%" at full utilisation, adding "The comet currently retains none of the interest borrowers pay at its optimal utilization." Comets being wound down are repriced by the same route: a 2 September 2026 forum proposal sets the Ethereum wstETH Comet's supply rate to zero ahead of deprecation. Live per-market APYs are on-chain only, so no APY is quoted.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
Custody modelEditorialNon-custodial: no company holds the coinsNon-custodial: no company holds the coins
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
Euler V2
77#4 of 8
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most — it scores 7/10 to Compound's 6/10 there (weight 32).
Strength
Blast radius — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Compound
74#6 of 8
Pick it when
Pick Compound if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Euler V2's 8/10 there (weight 24).
Strength
Rate authorship — 9/10
Tradeoff
Compound now has one of the cleanest RATE disclosures in this pool and one of the thinnest ORACLE disclosures, and a buyer who conflates the two will misprice it. Four specific traps. First, the page that tells you what liquidates you — https://docs.compound.finance/liquidation/ — never names an oracle at all ("This function uses the price returned by the protocol’s price feed"); Chainlink is named two clicks away on the helper-functions page, and a machine check of all nine Compound doc pages returns zero occurrences of deviation, heartbeat, staleness, median, fallback, killswitch or price bound. The one bounded feed Compound ever ran — the multisig-settable min/max and constant-price override added to rsETH after the 18 April 2026 Kelp bridge exploit — was REVERTED in May 2026 via Proposal 586, so as of today no Compound market carries a numeric price bound. Second, the docs registry is a snapshot, not live state: stamped 2026-02-28, it still advertises rsETH on the Ethereum USDC Comet at 85% borrow CF and a 1,500-token supply cap when the on-chain cap has since been set to 0, and it still lists ten mainnet networks when six of them — Polygon, Unichain, Linea, Mantle, Ronin and Scroll — are approved for deprecation with supply caps zeroed, collateral factors halved and supply rates being set to 0%. Read the Comet and the forum, not the docs table. Third, the one-week governance timelock that makes Compound's rate authorship trustworthy does NOT cover the emergency path: the Community Multi-Sig pause guardian can freeze withdrawals instantly (it did so across six networks in April 2026), and a 0% collateral factor mechanically locks collateral until debt is fully repaid — both disclosed on the forum, neither in the docs. Fourth, the named backstop is real but shrinking and undocumented at the tail: reserves on the Ethereum WETH Comet fell from 921.22 to 908.46 WETH between 10 May and 5 August 2026 because the comet "retains none of the interest borrowers pay at its optimal utilization", no Compound page says what happens once reserves are exhausted, and Compound discloses its losses well on comp.xyz and not at all on either page titled Security.
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
Euler V2Leads
Choose Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most
Oracle liquidation price: 7/10 against 6/10 for Compound (weight 32)
Blast radius: 9/10 against 7/10 for Compound (weight 24)
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
Compound
Choose Compound if rate authorship matters most
Rate authorship: 9/10 against 8/10 for Euler V2 (weight 24)
CompoundScore 74COMP-governed onchain money market whose Compound III (Comet) design gives each market exactly one borrowable base asset and a set of capped, non-lent collateral assets, priced by a single named Chainlink feed per asset with no published deviation bound, and liquidated whole by an absorb call paid out of protocol reserves.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Compound now has one of the cleanest RATE disclosures in this pool and one of the thinnest ORACLE disclosures, and a buyer who conflates the two will misprice it. Four specific traps. First, the page that tells you what liquidates you — https://docs.compound.finance/liquidation/ — never names an oracle at all ("This function uses the price returned by the protocol’s price feed"); Chainlink is named two clicks away on the helper-functions page, and a machine check of all nine Compound doc pages returns zero occurrences of deviation, heartbeat, staleness, median, fallback, killswitch or price bound. The one bounded feed Compound ever ran — the multisig-settable min/max and constant-price override added to rsETH after the 18 April 2026 Kelp bridge exploit — was REVERTED in May 2026 via Proposal 586, so as of today no Compound market carries a numeric price bound. Second, the docs registry is a snapshot, not live state: stamped 2026-02-28, it still advertises rsETH on the Ethereum USDC Comet at 85% borrow CF and a 1,500-token supply cap when the on-chain cap has since been set to 0, and it still lists ten mainnet networks when six of them — Polygon, Unichain, Linea, Mantle, Ronin and Scroll — are approved for deprecation with supply caps zeroed, collateral factors halved and supply rates being set to 0%. Read the Comet and the forum, not the docs table. Third, the one-week governance timelock that makes Compound's rate authorship trustworthy does NOT cover the emergency path: the Community Multi-Sig pause guardian can freeze withdrawals instantly (it did so across six networks in April 2026), and a 0% collateral factor mechanically locks collateral until debt is fully repaid — both disclosed on the forum, neither in the docs. Fourth, the named backstop is real but shrinking and undocumented at the tail: reserves on the Ethereum WETH Comet fell from 921.22 to 908.46 WETH between 10 May and 5 August 2026 because the comet "retains none of the interest borrowers pay at its optimal utilization", no Compound page says what happens once reserves are exhausted, and Compound discloses its losses well on comp.xyz and not at all on either page titled Security.
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Oracle liquidation price
by 1 of 10weight 7.7 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V27/10 out of 10
Compound6/10 out of 10
Rate authorship
by 1 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Compound leads
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Compound9/10 out of 10
Blast radius
by 2 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V29/10 out of 10
Compound7/10 out of 10
Shortfall record
weight 4.8 of 86Tie
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Compound8/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Euler V214/20Compound14/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Euler V219/30Compound17.7/30
Euler V2 leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Euler V22.7/10Compound2.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Euler V23.2/8Compound3.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Euler V28.3/18Compound8.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Euler V2 unless the term Compound leads on is the one you are buying.
Pick Compound if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Euler V2's 8/10 there (weight 24).
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
Next best action
If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who sets your rate — a utilisation curve or a curator? · 24% (Euler V2 8/10, Compound 9/10)
Oracle failure: a wrong price or outcome liquidates or settles a position.
Scored by What price gets you liquidated, and how far can it drift? · 32% (Euler V2 7/10, Compound 6/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If one market goes bad, how much of yours goes with it? · 24% (Euler V2 9/10, Compound 7/10)
Scored by Has it lost lender money before, and did it publish it? · 20% (Euler V2 8/10, Compound 8/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Contract failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Exit failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Euler V2 scores 3 points above Compound, led by oracle liquidation price and blast radius. Published scores, out of 100: Euler V2 77 (rank 4 of 8 lending & borrowing), Compound 74 (rank 6 of 8).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
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