Euler V2 scores 6 points above Aave, led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record. Euler V2 ranks #4 and Aave #8 of 8 published lending & borrowing. Every term of the gap is on the ledger below; the inputs are on the audit receipt.
Euler V277
vs
AAAave71
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99 · ranks #4 and #8 of 8
Euler V2 scores 6 points above Aave, led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record.
Euler V2 #4 of 877
AAAave #8 of 871
Scores are out of 100; published scores fall within 41–99; a bar is empty at 41 and full at 99.
Why, term by termEuler V2 leads on 3 of 4 published criteria; Aave on 1. The terms sum to the gap.
TermEuler V2AaveWeightPoints
Oracle liquidation price7/106/107.7+2.0for Euler V2+1.0 of 32
Blast radius9/106/105.8+4.5for Euler V2+2.3 of 32
Rate authorship8/109/105.8−1.5for Aave−0.8 of 32
Shortfall record8/107/104.8+1.2for Euler V2+0.6 of 32
Net of the terms+6.2
Reproduced gap+6.2
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7771+6.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.AaveScore 71The reference shared-pool money market: it publishes the loss waterfall, the risk-steward mandate and its own incident arithmetic in more detail than anyone in the category, and publishes no deviation threshold or heartbeat anywhere for the price that actually liquidates you.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Quick facts
At a glance
3 of 4 rows read the same for both.
FactEuler V2Aave
PricingSnapshotEuler charges no protocol fee today; a supplier's cost is the vault-level interest fee a curator or governor sets. The Interest Rates page (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/interest-rates, fetched 28 September 2026) states: "Euler does not currently charge protocol fees. In April 2026, Fee Flow was turned off and Euler protocol fees were set to 0% across live and future deployments. The DAO can reintroduce protocol fees through future governance." and "Curators and vault governors can still configure vault-level fees where supported by the vault. For EVK vaults, the interestFee parameter can allocate a portion of borrower interest to the configured fee receiver." It adds that "EVK interest fees are denominated in vault shares." Per-vault interestFee values are Data API fields, not page text, and vary by vault; supply and borrow rates float with each vault's own IRM, so no fixed APY is quoted.Aave charges no deposit or curator fee; suppliers earn borrower interest net of each reserve's reserve factor, and both rates float on a two-slope utilisation curve. The Interest Rate Strategy page (https://aave.com/docs/aave-v3/smart-contracts/interest-rate-strategy, fetched 28 September 2026): "Implements the calculation of the interest rates depending on the reserve state. The model of interest rate is based on two slopes" around the OPTIMAL_USAGE_RATIO kink. Aave's docs carry no live values (https://aave.com/docs/resources/parameters still shows only an SDK pointer); the numbers are published per change on the governance forum. LlamaRisk's Risk Steward post of 28 September 2026 (https://governance.aave.com/t/risk-stewards-cap-and-irm-changes-on-aave-v3-2026-09-28/25718) gives USDT on Aave V3 Core: "At the current 92.8% utilization, the post-change variable borrow rate would be 4.34% APR, down from 4.39% under the current IRM, and the supply rate would be 3.63% APR, down from 3.67%." It also states the protocol's take on one asset: "the 25% reserve factor that applies to USDe on all five reserves". Rates reprice every block with utilisation; these are point-in-time figures, not a quote.
Asset coverageEditorial——
Region fitSnapshotglobalglobal
Custody modelEditorialNon-custodial: no company holds the coinsNon-custodial: no company holds the coins
From the published criteria
Which should you pick?
Euler V2
77#4 of 8
Leads
Pick it when
Pick Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most — it scores 7/10 to Aave's 6/10 there (weight 32).
Strength
Blast radius — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
AA
Aave
71#8 of 8
Pick it when
Pick Aave if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Euler V2's 8/10 there (weight 24).
Strength
Rate authorship — 9/10
Tradeoff
Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Self-identify in 10 seconds
Which one is actually for you?
Euler V2Leads
Choose Euler V2 if oracle liquidation price matters most
Oracle liquidation price: 7/10 against 6/10 for Aave (weight 32)
Blast radius: 9/10 against 6/10 for Aave (weight 24)
Shortfall record: 8/10 against 7/10 for Aave (weight 20)
Euler V2Score 77Modular onchain lending where every market is its own vault: a third party picks your collateral, LTVs, oracle route and interest-rate model, and Euler publishes the resulting parameters — including a continuously recalculated, per-vault bad-debt figure — through its own data API rather than on the security page a buyer would actually read.Strength: Blast radius — 9/10Watch-out: Read the vault page before the protocol page. On Euler the protocol does not set your terms — one vault does, and Euler says so: 'Pause, guardian, curator, allocator, fee-recipient, cap, oracle, and other powers may belong to different addresses' (https://docs.euler.finance/learn/risk-curators). Before depositing, pull the specific vault's bad-debt row from Euler's own API — the borrowVault filter is a documented parameter and works: https://v3.euler.finance/v3/evk/vaults/bad-debt?chainId=1&borrowVault=YOUR_VAULT — because the security page will not tell you. On 2026-08-17 that endpoint carried $166,460,285.30 of standing bad debt across eleven chains, $134,245,336.28 of it priced within the minute. The single largest row, on one Plasma vault (0x57c582346B7d49A46Af3745A8278917D1c1311b8, 19 accounts), was $86,609,850.77 then ($90.76M debt against $4.15M collateral) and ~$90,813,221.34 on 2026-09-28, with collateral now $0 — the Plasma wipeout Euler describes in prose without ever attaching a number to it. On mainnet eUSDC-64, then the fifth-largest market by borrows, carried $13,604,080.55 of bad debt against $14,383,648.32 of borrows, and on 2026-09-28 it was still mainnet's largest bad-debt row at ~$13,609,495.61; socializeDebt is true on it, so that write-down falls on that vault's depositors alone, and there is nothing left to exit with — the vault reports utilization 1.0 and totalCash of 1 base unit (0.000001 USDC) against $14.38M supplied, with withdraw and redeem both flagged as hooked operations. Nothing on https://docs.euler.finance/security mentions any of it.
AAAave
Choose Aave if rate authorship matters most
Rate authorship: 9/10 against 8/10 for Euler V2 (weight 24)
AaveScore 71The reference shared-pool money market: it publishes the loss waterfall, the risk-steward mandate and its own incident arithmetic in more detail than anyone in the category, and publishes no deviation threshold or heartbeat anywhere for the price that actually liquidates you.Strength: Rate authorship — 9/10Watch-out: Read the April 2026 rsETH incident report before you supply anything to a WETH reserve — https://governance.aave.com/t/rseth-incident-report-april-20-2026/24580 — but read it together with its 2026-05-09 sequel, because the outcome was better than the report's models. An exploit entirely outside Aave (a 1-of-1 DVN bridge on someone else's LRT) put 89,567 rsETH ($221.39M) of collateral into Aave markets against $190.86M of WETH borrows. LlamaRisk modelled $123.7M-$230.1M of bad debt landing on ordinary WETH suppliers by reserve write-down — but those were explicitly labelled hypothetical scenarios, and per https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-weth-unfreeze-and-ltv-restoration-across-aave-v3-instances/24878 the attacker's Aave positions were liquidated on 2026-05-06, all 89,567 rsETH was recovered, and the residual was covered by the DeFi United coalition. What you should still price is the machinery the event exposed, which has not changed: the Umbrella backstop covers Ethereum Core only and was PAUSED rather than drawn, so an Arbitrum, Base or Mantle supplier has no backstop at all; every affected WETH reserve sat at 100% utilisation with "idle balances below $20 on every chain", meaning a supplier with a perfectly healthy position could not withdraw; and the collateral that caused it was priced by an oracle whose deviation threshold and heartbeat appear nowhere in Aave's 91-page documentation corpus. None of this appears on https://aave.com/security, which still says "zero bad debt".
Criterion by criterion
Scorecard
Published criteria · weight in points of 868 of 8 cells scored. Strength is read from the evidence file; the weight is the published one. Methodology
Oracle liquidation price
by 1 of 10weight 7.7 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V27/10 out of 10
Aave6/10 out of 10
Rate authorship
by 1 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Aave leads
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Aave9/10 out of 10
Blast radius
by 3 of 10weight 5.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V29/10 out of 10
Aave6/10 out of 10
Shortfall record
by 1 of 10weight 4.8 of 86Euler V2 leads
Euler V28/10 out of 10
Aave7/10 out of 10
Score dimensions
weights sum to 86
The published score is five dimensions, each weighted for the category. "Published criteria" is the criteria block above; the other four are the engine's own terms — availability, friction, trust record, measured data. Each bar is one side's points out of that dimension's maximum; the weight beside the name is its points of the 86-point weighted total. The published criteria above can fill 24 of the block’s 30. A weight marked “constant here” belongs to a dimension every ranked product in the category holds at the same value: it still counts in the total, and it orders nothing here.
Availabilityweight 20 of 86 · constant here
Euler V214/20Aave14/20
Tie
Published criteriaweight 30 of 86
Euler V219/30Aave16.6/30
Euler V2 leads
Frictionweight 10 of 86 · constant here
Euler V22.7/10Aave2.7/10
Tie
Trust recordweight 8 of 86 · constant here
Euler V23.2/8Aave3.2/8
Tie
Measured dataweight 18 of 86 · constant here
Euler V28.3/18Aave8.3/18
Tie
Decision rulePublished order
Choose Euler V2 unless the term Aave leads on is the one you are buying.
Pick Aave if rate authorship matters most — it scores 9/10 to Euler V2's 8/10 there (weight 24).
The published order weighs every criterion the same way for everyone. To weigh them your way, run .
From the published order
Next best action
If this isn't your case
Other matchups worth comparing
How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who sets your rate — a utilisation curve or a curator? · 24% (Euler V2 8/10, Aave 9/10)
Oracle failure: a wrong price or outcome liquidates or settles a position.
Scored by What price gets you liquidated, and how far can it drift? · 32% (Euler V2 7/10, Aave 6/10)
Insolvency failure: the firm or issuer that owes you cannot pay.
Scored by If one market goes bad, how much of yours goes with it? · 24% (Euler V2 9/10, Aave 6/10)
Scored by Has it lost lender money before, and did it publish it? · 20% (Euler V2 8/10, Aave 7/10)
Not assessed by this ranking: Contract failure, Regulatory failure, Execution failure, Exit failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
Euler V2 scores 6 points above Aave, led by oracle liquidation price, blast radius, and shortfall record. Published scores, out of 100: Euler V2 77 (rank 4 of 8 lending & borrowing), Aave 71 (rank 8 of 8).
Reviewed means both products compared here was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.
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