Published verdictRanking snapshot 3 November 2026
Ripple USD (RLUSD) leads by 17 points
Ripple USD (RLUSD) scores 17 points above DAI, led by counterparty and insolvency rank, redemption right exercised, and reserve and assurance scope.
DADAI #5 of 1158
Ripple USD (RLUSD) #3 of 1175Why, term by termRipple USD (RLUSD) leads on 3 of 4 published criteria; DAI on 0. The terms sum to the gap.
TermRipple USD (RLUSD)DAIWeightPoints
Counterparty and insolvency rank5/102/107.2+5.6for Ripple USD (RLUSD)+2.9 of 32
Redemption right exercised5/104/106.7+1.7for Ripple USD (RLUSD)+0.9 of 32
Reserve and assurance scope8/102/105.8+9.0for Ripple USD (RLUSD)+4.6 of 32
Net of the terms+16.3
Reproduced gap+16.4
Published gapAfter score rounding and bounds — see the note below7558+17.0
Weight is in points of the 86-point weighted total. Points are score points of the gap between the two.
Ripple USD (RLUSD)Score 75The best-evidenced reserve in the pool sitting behind a much weaker holder claim: Deloitte examines CUSIP-level T-bills at a named custodian monthly, while the binding terms tell the holder they have no property interest in any of it, no fiduciary is owed to them, and they cannot redeem unless they become an institutional Customer under a contract Ripple does not publish.Strength: Reserve and assurance scope — 8/10Watch-out: The regulatory scaffolding around RLUSD is genuinely better than most of this pool, and the reserve disclosure is the best in it — CUSIP-level, Deloitte-examined, monthly, with a named custodian. None of that is the same thing as a claim you can enforce, and the gap between the two is this record's whole point. The binding RLUSD User Terms say the reserve is “segregated from SCTC's other assets” and then say, in the same subsection, “RLUSD does not convey any direct or indirect property interest in or right to withdraw any assets held in the Reserve”, and later that “Ripple does not provide any trust or fiduciary services to any User under these Terms.” Meanwhile the whitepaper says deposits are “held specifically for the benefit of RLUSD holders”, the attestation criteria say the Reserve holds assets “on behalf of RLUSD holders”, and the OCC letter describes “collateral trustee services for the benefit of RLUSD holders on a fiduciary basis” — for a bank that does not yet exist, under an approval the OCC expressly labels preliminary. The contract governs, and it gives the holder a segregation covenant with no stated insolvency rank, no property interest and no fiduciary duty. Second caveat, on comparability: the 2026-09-29 re-read raised criterion 2 from 4 to 5, the bottom of the band the methodology names for RLUSD, and level with USDC. The terms grant every holder a redemption right and then condition it on becoming a Customer, and the 2026 whitepaper's gate is the same shape as Circle Mint's closure to individuals, which the ladder already weighs for USDC in that band: “Ripple will not conduct B2C transactions.” Third: the terms are stale in a way that matters. They are stamped “Last updated: October 3, 2024” — and still so on 2026-09-29, almost two years on — and in the interim the OCC preliminarily approved a Ripple national trust bank intended to hold the reserve as collateral trustee. If that bank opens, the custody architecture behind this coin changes and the binding document describing it will not have moved. Finally, one number that is not a defect but should not be misread: the LEI on the current whitepaper resolves to the right company with entity status ACTIVE, but its GLEIF REGISTRATION status is LAPSED. Those are different fields; a lapsed identifier registration is not a lapsed charter, and it is scored as nothing more. Two things changed when every document was read again. First, the NYDFS redeemability question is settled, in Ripple's favour on the gate itself: the June 8, 2022 guidance, retrieved this session as bytes from the Internet Archive's raw replay of the dfs.ny.gov URL, confers a par redemption right on “any lawful holder” but expressly subjects it to “reasonable, non-burdensome conditions … such as the ability of the stablecoin holder to onboard successfully with the Issuer before redeeming.” The regulator permits the onboarding gate. What the regulator also requires — “clear, conspicuous redemption policies, approved in advance by DFS in writing”, with a default of T+2 where the issuer does not state its own — Ripple does not publish, which is why criterion 2 goes no higher than 5, the bottom of its band. Second, criterion 4 scores 5, not 6: the chain has twenty role grants; the MINTER and BURNER roles are held not only behind the multisig but also by a Wormhole NttManager proxy that appears in no Ripple document; and because MultiSign weights signatures, replacing the code takes three signatures, not seven. The freeze power had been exercised 192 times by August 2026; the 2026-09-29 re-read counts 214 against 214 distinct addresses since August 2024, 22 of them new and most on 2026-08-25, with not a single reversal and no published record of any of it. Nothing in the reserve or the attestation changed; the CUSIP schedule was re-read position by position and every figure reproduced.DAIScore 58DAI is the only coin in this pool with no issuer: the sole binding agreement a holder can reach names its counterparty as bare "Skybase International" with no corporate suffix, no jurisdiction and no company number, states in its Version 2.0 of 1 September 2026 that Skybase International "does not control or operate any version of the Sky Protocol", and never mentions DAI — so nobody owes the holder a dollar and there is no estate to rank in. What exists instead is an immutable, un-freezable, un-upgradeable token whose mint authority is provably frozen to a single contract for all time, and whose 1:1 exit into USDC is real, permissionless, uncapped and currently free — and is a governance parameter that can be switched off in the same block it is decided.Strength: Seizure and upgrade authority — 5/10Watch-out: The thing that makes DAI feel dollar-redeemable — an instant, zero-fee, no-KYC, no-minimum 1:1 swap into USDC that works at billion-dollar size today — is a mutable governance parameter, not a promise, and it can be revoked faster than governance can normally act. This is now quoted from the source rather than inferred: DssLitePsmMom (0x467b32b0407Ad764f56304420Cddaa563bDab425, verified source, Sourcify exact_match) carries a section banner reading "Governance actions without delay" directly above "function halt(address psm, Flow what) external auth {". A second model run confirmed the mom is armed: PSM.wards(0x467b...b425) = 1 at block 25,789,445. The PSM's own source states "Setting `tin` or `tout` to `HALTED` effectively disables selling and buying gems respectively.", HALTED is "uint256 public constant HALTED = type(uint256).max;", and buyGem opens with "require(tout_ != HALTED, "DssLitePsm/buy-gem-halted");" — so the exit closes the same block it is decided, bypassing the 48-hour governance delay (MCD_PAUSE.delay() = 172800 seconds, re-read on-chain), while Sky's own documentation says only "Fees could change in the future." The chainlog also publishes a purpose-built emergency spell factory for this action, EMSP_LITE_PSM_HALT_FAB (0xB261b73698F6dBC03cB1E998A3176bdD81C3514A). Compounding it: the exit does not deliver dollars, it delivers USDC — "gem.transferFrom(pocket, usr, gemAmt);" — another issuer's token whose own retail redemption is gated, and the 4.13B USDC funding it sits at a single address Circle can blacklist (USDC.isBlacklisted(pocket) resolves and returned false at block 25,789,445 — the power is live, merely unused). And the holder has no unilateral fallback: the Emergency Shutdown Module that historically converted DAI into a direct pro-rata claim on collateral is disarmed — developers.skyeco.com/archive/shutdown/emergency-shutdown/ carries "The Emergency Shutdown Module ESM is currently deprecated" and MCD_ESM.min() returns 2^256-1 against a fire() guarded by "require(Sum >= min, "ESM/min-not-reached");", with ESM.Sum() standing at 0.0013058682050532. Sum can never reach min, so it can never be fired. Only Sky governance can now cage the system.