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Calibration corpus

The failures our criteria are built to catch

Each ranking criterion asks a question that a real failure answered too late. These are the failures the methodology records name, the published criterion each one calibrates, and the record's own words saying so. Every date links to the source it was read from.

FTX (November 2022)

An SEC complaint alleges FTX paused all customer withdrawals on 8 November 2022 and that customer funds were diverted to Alameda. FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research and affiliates filed Chapter 11 on 11 November. At filing, FTX.com held 0.1% of the Bitcoin customers believed it held, FTX later said. Under a plan effective January 2025, FTX announced distributions reaching 105% of allowed customer entitlement claims by July 2026.

What it calibrates
If this exchange fails — or freezes me — are the coins legally mine, and on whose terms?
Exchanges · criterion insolvency_and_account_terms

The criterion reads what a venue’s own documents say happens to customer assets if it fails. The record names FTX among the failures whose customers learned that answer only in bankruptcy court.

“Score the documented legal-contractual fate of customer assets — the axis FTX, Celsius and Voyager customers discovered only in bankruptcy court…” — the Exchanges methodology record
What does the free tier quietly stop tracking, and will this app outlive my history?
Portfolio Tracking · criterion tier_truth_and_continuity

The portfolio-tracking record asks whether an app will outlive your history, and lists Blockfolio, destroyed via FTX in November 2022, first among the category’s casualties.

“…dense casualty list: Blockfolio destroyed via FTX (Nov 2022), Accointing shut down 2023 post-acquisition, Zapper switched off 3 Aug 2026.” — the Portfolio Tracking methodology record
Dated, with the source each date was read from
  1. · FTX paused all customer withdrawals, according to the SEC complaint (an allegation in a civil complaint filed 13 December 2022). Source
  2. · FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research, Blockfolio, Inc. and affiliated debtors filed for Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Case No. 22-11068). Source
  3. · FTX filed its amended plan; its release states that at the Chapter 11 filing FTX.com held only 0.1% of the Bitcoin and 1.2% of the Ethereum customers believed it held. Source
  4. · The confirmed plan took effect. Source
  5. · Fifth distribution, announced 17 July 2026: cumulative 105% of allowed FTX.com and FTX US customer entitlement claims (announced figures). Source

Celsius Network (June 2022)

Celsius paused withdrawals on June 12, 2022 and filed for Chapter 11 on July 13, 2022. On January 4, 2023, the bankruptcy court ruled its Terms of Use transferred title to Earn deposits, making Earn assets (about $4.2 billion on July 10, 2022) estate property and holders unsecured creditors. The plan took effect January 31, 2024, when Celsius said it began distributing over $3 billion in cryptocurrency and fiat.

What it calibrates
If this exchange fails — or freezes me — are the coins legally mine, and on whose terms?
Exchanges · criterion insolvency_and_account_terms

The criterion reads what a venue’s own documents say happens to customer assets if it fails. The record names Celsius among the failures whose customers learned that answer only in bankruptcy court.

“Score the documented legal-contractual fate of customer assets — the axis FTX, Celsius and Voyager customers discovered only in bankruptcy court…” — the Exchanges methodology record
If they fail, are the assets still mine — or am I queueing as an unsecured creditor?
Institutional Custody · criterion insolvency_survival_mechanism

The institutional-custody criterion names Celsius among the real failures it was written for: its terms transferred title to the assets.

“…real failures: Celsius (terms transferred title, so a court sent…” — the Institutional Custody methodology record
Dated, with the source each date was read from
  1. · Celsius paused all withdrawals, Swap and transfers between accounts, citing extreme market conditions. Source
  2. · Celsius Network LLC and affiliated debtors filed for Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 22-10964). Source
  3. · The bankruptcy court held that the Terms of Use transferred title and ownership of Earn assets to Celsius, making them property of the estate. Source
  4. · The plan took effect and distributions of liquid cryptocurrency and cash began. Source

Nomad bridge exploit (August 2022)

Nomad says its token bridge was hacked on 1 August 2022 for more than $186M by over 300 addresses, and traced it to a 21 June 2022 upgrade that let unproven messages through. It halted the bridge, offered bounties of up to 10%, and by 17 August had recovered about 20% (over $37M). From 20 December 2022, holders passing KYC could claim pro-rata shares of recovered funds.

What it calibrates
Trust posture
Bridges · criterion trust

The bridges record gives trust posture 26 of its 100 points, and names a bridge still soliciting the return of its users’ money as the case that scale cannot hold.

“Trust posture carries 26 of the 100 points in this category; a bridge still soliciting the return of its users…” — the Bridges methodology record
Dated, with the source each date was read from
  1. · Nomad upgraded its production contracts; its root cause analysis says this upgrade introduced the code that let unproven messages be processed. Source
  2. · Nomad says its token bridge was hacked for more than $186M, with over 300 unique addresses taking part. Source
  3. · Nomad reported about 20% of the funds (over $37M) recovered and the token bridge shut down. Source
  4. · Nomad relaunched the token bridge for holders to unbridge and claim their share of recovered funds. Source
  5. · Read on this date, the front page of docs.nomad.xyz is still the Funds Recovery notice asking for funds to be returned. Source

Multichain (July 2023)

Multichain (formerly Anyswap) posted on 6 July 2023 that lockup assets on its MPC address had moved to an unknown address; on 7 July, that its service had stopped and all bridge transactions would be stuck on the source chains. On 14 July it said Chinese police took its CEO away on 21 May. A Singapore High Court judgment, on the claimant's uncontested account, records over US$127 million moved from the bridge wallet.

What it calibrates
Trust posture
Bridges · criterion trust

The bridges record will not score Multichain on trust posture at any weight: its own team told users to stop using the bridge, and its bridge API no longer answered when the record was read.

“…the bridge API behind it, bridgeapi.multichain.org, returned HTTP 522 (origin unreachable) on the same day. A bridge whose own team told you to stop using it three years ago and never spoke again cannot be scored on trust posture at any weight.” — the Bridges methodology record
Dated, with the source each date was read from
  1. · By Multichain’s own statement of 14 July 2023, its CEO was taken away by the Chinese police on this day and had been out of contact with the team since. Source
  2. · Multichain posted that the lockup assets on its MPC address had been moved to an unknown address abnormally. Source
  3. · Multichain posted that its service had stopped, that all bridge transactions would be stuck on the source chains, and that users should not use the bridging service. Source
  4. · Multichain posted a numbered statement whose first point dates the CEO’s detention to 21 May 2023. Source

Bybit cold-wallet theft (February 2025)

On 21 February 2025 a scheduled transfer from Bybit's Ethereum multisig cold wallet was manipulated, moving over 400,000 ETH and stETH (over $1.4 billion per Bybit; about $1.5 billion per the FBI) to an unidentified address. Signers approved it through a compromised Safe{Wallet} web interface. Bybit kept withdrawals open and reported closing the ETH gap in client assets by 24 February. The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea.

What it calibrates
Upgrade control and key holders
Smart Accounts & Multisig · criterion upgradeControl

The smart-accounts record scores who can change an account’s code because the Bybit loss ran through that path, and prefers accounts whose upgrade authority is verifiably burned.

“Prefer immutable with verifiably burned upgrade authority over owner-upgradeable. A treasury cannot re-audit a contract that can change beneath it, and the $1.4B Bybit loss was the upgrade path executing as designed rather than any cryptographic failure.” — the Smart Accounts & Multisig methodology record
Dated, with the source each date was read from
  1. · Bybit said it detected unauthorised activity during a scheduled transfer from its ETH multisig cold wallet to its hot wallet, and that the transaction had been manipulated. Source
  2. · Bybit’s same-day update said withdrawals were not halted and were being processed as normal. Source
  3. · Bybit said it had restored reserves to a 1:1 ratio for in-scope assets and fully closed the ETH gap in client assets. Source
  4. · The FBI said North Korea was responsible for the theft of about $1.5 billion in virtual assets from Bybit, naming the activity TraderTraitor. Source
  5. · The Safe Ecosystem Foundation said the attack came through a compromised Safe{Wallet} developer machine and that the external review found no vulnerabilities in the Safe smart contracts. Source

Since the rankings ledger began: failures and what the ranking said

Every exploit above $1M since that hit a product we rank or refuse, with where that product stood 30 and 90 days before, read from the rankings ledger and the refusals. A product counts as flagged when it was refused for falling short (a refusal that only points to its ranked record, or says it is out of scope, region-locked, not live or gone, is not counted), or ranked in the lower half of its category. A failure counts as flagged when every product it hit that was on record 30 days before was flagged then.

2 of 4 failures were flagged 30 days before.

  1. Astroport, , $4.9M · flagged
    • Astroport, refused in DEXs: 30 days before, refused (on record since 19 August 2026); 90 days before, not yet observed; flagged for 34 days before the event
  2. Bitget, , $387M · flagged
    • Bitget, refused in Exchanges: 30 days before, refused (on record since 18 August 2026); 90 days before, not yet observed; flagged for 37 days before the event
  3. NEAR Intents, , $3.8M · not flagged
    • near_intents in Intent Networks: 30 days before, #3 of 7 (score 70); 90 days before, not yet observed
    • NEAR Intents, refused in Cross-Chain Swaps: 30 days before, listed as refused but only as a duplicate of its ranked record, so not counted; 90 days before, not yet observed
  4. Ledger (Supply Chain), , $93M · not flagged
Post-failure note · published , after the 15 October 2026 it was due

NEAR Intents, 1 October 2026, $3.8M

Rank in Intent Networks in the year before, from the ledger (chart)

29 August 2026: #3 (score 70) · 2 September 2026: #3 (score 69) · 28 September 2026: #4 (score 65)

The criteria that missed it

None of the four published intents criteria could have caught it. Intents ranks bid-set visibility (34), solver admission (20), network-fee disclosure (22) and the fallback when nobody fills (24): how fair and how clear the auction is, not whether the contracts and the deposit and withdrawal infrastructure behind it are safe. The loss came from how NEAR Intents' Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure interacted with its contract, a layer no intents criterion reads. The dependency register (data/dependencies.json) does not list Omni as something NEAR Intents rests on either.

The signals on record before it

The record held nothing that pointed at it. NEAR Intents' four scores (6, 2, 8, 6) were read from its documentation on 2026-09-28 and still hold word for word. It ranked #3 of 7 from 2026-08-29 and #4 from 2026-09-28, on auction design, three days before the exploit.

The methodology change

None yet. The gap is that a category whose products route funds through contracts and bridges scores no contract or bridge security; the same is true of other routing categories. Adding such a criterion is a methodology change that needs the owner's sign-off and a golden diff, and is listed as an open item, not made here.

Commission earned from near_intents in the 12 months before

€0. No commission programme with NEAR Intents exists (data/partner-programs.json has no row for it), so nothing was earned.

The incident census

DefiLlama’s public hacks list holds 562 events above $1M since (read ). 117 carry the name of something we rank, refuse or depend on, and each was reviewed: 97 hit it (67 a ranked product, 44 a refusal, 1 a dependency) and 20 were another entity of the same name. The build fails when a new one is not reviewed, or when an exploit on a ranked product has no extraordinary review.

Since the review rule was approved on 15 September 2026, 3 ranked placements were hit; the time from each event to the moment we recorded it was a median of 11 days (90th percentile 19). The watcher meant to find them within hours runs on GitHub Actions and no review came from it; the census found them.

All 97 matched events
  1. · Ledger (Supply Chain), $93M: Ledger signers sold by CryptoBilis, a Southeast Asian reseller on Ledger’s official-reseller list, carried a hardware implant that captured recovery phrases; Ledger says its Secure Element, OS and direct sales channel were not affected, has not stated the model or where the units were tampered with, and has not verified the loss total. Tibane Labs found a similar implant in Nano X units bought through Japanese resale channels. Hit ledger in Hardware Wallets; ledger-nano-x in Hardware Wallets.
  2. · NEAR Intents, $3.8M: NEAR Intents lost about $3.8M in USDT on BSC through a flaw in how its Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure met its contract; deposits and withdrawals paused. Hit near_intents in Intent Networks; NEAR Intents, refused in Cross-Chain Swaps.
  3. · Bitget, $387M: Bitget’s hot wallets were drained of about $387M. Hit Bitget, refused in Exchanges.
  4. · Astroport, $4.9M: Astroport’s governance passed a malicious proposal. Hit Astroport, refused in DEXs.
  5. · Moonwell Lending, $8.7M: Moonwell was drained through price manipulation. Hit Moonwell, refused in Flash Loan Venues.
  6. · Harmony Bridge, $3.2M: Harmony’s bridge was exploited again. Hit Harmony Horizon Bridge, refused in Bridges; harmony in Sidechains.
  7. · COLDCARD, $116M: COLDCARD devices generated weak keys and owners’ funds were drained. Hit coldcard in Hardware Wallets.
  8. · Triple-A, $9.7M: Triple-A’s hot wallet keys were compromised. Hit triplea in Payment Gateways.
  9. · Across, $4.5M: Across accepted a spoofed event log and released funds. Hit across in Bridges; across-swap in Cross-Chain Swaps; across-intents in Intent Networks; Across Protocol, refused in Cross-Chain Messaging.
  10. · Ostium, $23.8M: Ostium’s keys were compromised and its liquidity pool drained. Hit ostium_olp in Perp House Vaults.
  11. · Polymarket International, $3M: Polymarket’s front end was compromised. Hit polymarket in Prediction Markets.
  12. · Taiko Bridge, $1.7M: Taiko’s bridge accepted a forged proof. Hit taiko-alethia in L2 Blockchains; taiko in Shared Sequencers.
  13. · Aztec Bridge, $2M: Aztec’s bridge was exploited through a logic flaw. Hit aztec_network_privacy in Privacy Tools.
  14. · Aztec Connect, $2.1M: Aztec Connect, Aztec’s earlier rollup, accepted a forged proof. Hit aztec_network_privacy in Privacy Tools.
  15. · Raydium AMM, $1.3M: Raydium’s AMM minted unbacked LP tokens. Hit raydium-dex in DEXs; raydium in Web3 Apps.
  16. · Axelar Secret IBC Bridge, $4.7M: Axelar’s route to Secret Network minted unbacked tokens. Hit axelar in Cross-Chain Messaging; Axelar, a dependency; Axelar, refused in Bridges.
  17. · Humanity, $32M: Humanity Protocol’s keys were compromised. Hit humanity_protocol in Proof of Personhood.
  18. · Gnosis Pay, $1.5M: Gnosis Pay lost funds through a signature-verification flaw. Hit Gnosis Pay, refused in Crypto Cards.
  19. · THORChain DEX, $10.7M: THORChain’s bridge logic was exploited. Hit THORChain, refused in Bridges.
  20. · Ekubo, $1.4M: Ekubo’s contracts drained wallets that had approved them. Hit Ekubo, refused in DEXs.
  21. · Kelp, $293M: Kelp’s rsETH cross-chain messages were spoofed and unbacked rsETH minted. Hit Kelp DAO (rsETH), refused in Liquid Staking; kelp-dao in Restaking.
  22. · CoW Swap, $1.2M: CoW Swap’s domain was hijacked and its front end served a drainer. Hit cowswap in DEX Aggregators; cow_protocol in Intent Networks; cow_swap in MEV Protection.
  23. · Drift Trade, $295M: Drift’s program upgrade authority was hijacked and the protocol drained. Hit drift in Perp DEXs.
  24. · Venus Core Pool, $3.7M: Venus’s Core Pool was drained through a donation flaw. Hit venus in Lending & Borrowing.
  25. · SolvBTC, $2.7M: SolvBTC was minted without backing. Hit solvbtc in Wrapped Assets.
  26. · Moonwell Lending, $1.8M: Moonwell lost funds to a misconfigured oracle. Hit Moonwell, refused in Flash Loan Venues.
  27. · Step Finance, $40M: Step Finance’s treasury keys were compromised. Hit Step Finance, refused in DeFi Dashboards.
  28. · Matcha, $13.4M: Matcha’s front end was compromised. Hit matcha in DEX Aggregators; matcha in Web3 Apps.
  29. · Trust Wallet Wallet, $8.5M: A compromised Trust Wallet browser-extension release drained users’ wallets. Hit trust_wallet in Wallets.
  30. · Yearn Ether, $9M: Yearn’s yETH pool was drained through an accounting flaw. Hit yearn in Yield Vaults; yearn_yieldagg in Yield Aggregators.
  31. · Upbit, $36M: Upbit’s Solana hot wallet was drained. Hit upbit in Exchanges.
  32. · Balancer V2, $128M: Balancer v2’s composable stable pools were drained through a rounding flaw. Hit balancer-dex in DEXs; balancer_v2 in Flash Loan Venues; Balancer, refused in Web3 Apps.
  33. · Typus Perp, $3.4M: Typus’s perp vault lost funds to a misconfigured oracle. Hit typus in Options Vaults.
  34. · SwissBorg, $41.5M: SwissBorg’s SOL Earn programme lost funds through its staking partner’s API. Hit SwissBorg, refused in Exchanges; SwissBorg, refused in Simple Buy.
  35. · BtcTurk, $48M: BtcTurk’s hot wallets were drained a second time. Hit BtcTurk and Paribu, refused in Exchanges.
  36. · CoinDCX, $44.2M: CoinDCX’s internal operational account was drained. Hit coindcx in Exchanges.
  37. · GMX V1 EVM, $42M: GMX v1’s GLP pool on Arbitrum was drained through reentrancy. Hit gmx in Perp DEXs.
  38. · Cetus CLMM, $223M: Cetus’s pools on Sui were drained through an overflow bug. Hit Cetus, refused in DEXs.
  39. · Term Finance, $1.7M: Term Finance lost funds to a misconfigured oracle. Hit term_finance in Fixed-Rate Yield.
  40. · Loopscale, $5.8M: Loopscale’s vaults were drained through price manipulation. Hit loopscale in Fixed-Rate Yield.
  41. · Bitget, $100M: Bitget’s VOXEL futures market was abused through market-maker bots; Bitget rolled back trades. Hit Bitget, refused in Exchanges.
  42. · 1inch Swap, $5M: Resolvers on 1inch Fusion v1 were drained through a flaw in its settlement contract. Hit 1inch in DEX Aggregators; 1inch (Fusion / 1inch Shield), refused in MEV Protection.
  43. · Bybit, $1,400M: Bybit’s Ethereum cold wallet was drained through a compromised signing interface. Hit bybit_exchange in Exchanges; bybit-eth-staking in Retail Staking.
  44. · NoOnes, $7.9M: NoOnes’ hot wallets on several chains were drained. Hit noones in P2P Exchanges.
  45. · AARK (Aark Digital), $1.9M: Aark’s vault was drained through a decimal error. Hit Aark, refused in Perp House Vaults.
  46. · Ronin Bridge, $12M: The Ronin bridge was drained after an upgrade left it uninitialised. Hit ronin in Appchains / L3s; Ronin Bridge, refused in Bridges; Ronin, refused in L2 Blockchains; Ronin, refused in Sidechains.
  47. · WazirX: India, $234.9M: WazirX’s multisig wallet was drained. Hit WazirX, refused in Exchanges.
  48. · CoinStats, $2.2M: Wallets created in CoinStats were drained after its infrastructure was breached. Hit coinstats-dash in DeFi Dashboards; coinstats in Portfolio Tracking.
  49. · BtcTurk, $54M: BtcTurk’s hot wallets were drained. Hit BtcTurk and Paribu, refused in Exchanges.
  50. · Loopring, $5M: Loopring Smart Wallets were drained through its official guardian’s two-factor service. Hit Loopring Smart Wallet, refused in Key Recovery & Inheritance.
  51. · pump.fun, $1.9M: A former pump.fun employee drained its bonding-curve contracts. Hit Pump.fun, refused in Web3 Apps; pump_fun in Token Launch Platforms.
  52. · Rain, $14.8M: Rain, the Bahrain exchange, lost funds from its wallets. Hit Rain, refused in Exchanges.
  53. · Hedgey, $44.7M: Hedgey’s token-claim contracts were drained. Hit hedgey in Incentive Distribution.
  54. · Bungee, $3.3M: Bungee (SOCKET)’s route contract drained wallets that had approved it. Hit bungee in Bridges; bungee_socket in Cross-Chain Swaps; Bungee / SOCKET Protocol, refused in Intent Networks.
  55. · Gamma, $4.5M: Gamma’s vaults were drained through price manipulation. Hit gamma_strategies in Liquidity Management.
  56. · KyberSwap Elastic, $48M: KyberSwap Elastic, the AMM the KyberSwap aggregator routes through, was drained. Hit kyberswap in DEX Aggregators.
  57. · dYdX V3, $9M: dYdX v3’s insurance fund paid out after the YFI market was manipulated. Hit dydx in Perp DEXs.
  58. · HTX, $8M: HTX’s hot wallet was drained. Hit HTX, refused in Exchanges.
  59. · Exactly, $7.6M: Exactly Protocol’s periphery contract was exploited. Hit exactly_protocol in Fixed-Rate Yield.
  60. · Curve DEX, $61.7M: Several Curve pools were drained through a Vyper compiler reentrancy bug. Hit curve-dex in DEXs; curve in Web3 Apps.
  61. · Multichain, $126M: Multichain’s bridge was drained after its CEO’s arrest; the protocol later shut down. Hit Multichain, refused in Bridges; Multichain, refused in Cross-Chain Swaps; Multichain / Anyswap anyTokens, refused in Cross-Chain Token Standards.
  62. · Tornado Cash, $2.2M: Tornado Cash governance was taken over by a malicious proposal. Hit tornado_cash_mixer in Privacy Tools.
  63. · Yearn Finance, $11.5M: Yearn’s legacy v1 yUSDT vault was drained through a misconfiguration. Hit yearn in Yield Vaults; yearn_yieldagg in Yield Aggregators.
  64. · SushiSwap, $3.3M: SushiSwap’s RouteProcessor2 drained wallets that had approved it. Hit sushiswap-dex in DEXs.
  65. · Euler V1, $197M: Euler v1 was drained through a donation flaw. Hit euler in Lending & Borrowing.
  66. · Raydium AMM, $4.4M: Raydium’s pool owner key was taken through malware and its pools drained. Hit raydium-dex in DEXs; raydium in Web3 Apps.
  67. · 3Commas, $20M: 3Commas users’ exchange API keys leaked and were used to drain accounts. Hit 3commas in Trading Bots.
  68. · FTX, $450M: FTX’s wallets were drained on the day of its bankruptcy filing. Hit FTX, Celsius and Voyager (the casualties), refused in Exchanges.
  69. · Wintermute, $160M: Wintermute’s DeFi operations wallet, a Profanity vanity address, was drained. Hit wintermute_otc in OTC Desks.
  70. · Nomad, $190M: Nomad’s bridge accepted forged messages after an upgrade. Hit Nomad, refused in Bridges.
  71. · Harmony Bridge, $100M: Harmony’s Horizon bridge multisig keys were compromised. Hit Harmony Horizon Bridge, refused in Bridges; harmony in Sidechains.
  72. · Osmosis, $5M: Osmosis’s liquidity pools were drained through an LP-share accounting flaw. Hit osmosis-dex in DEXs.
  73. · Wintermute, $17.6M: Wintermute lost 20M OP sent to an address it did not control on Optimism. Hit wintermute_otc in OTC Desks.
  74. · Mirror, $2M: Mirror Protocol on Terra lost funds to a stale oracle after the LUNA collapse. Hit Mirror Protocol mAssets, Binance Stock Tokens, FTX (CM-Equity / Digital Assets AG) tokenised stocks, refused in Tokenised Equities.
  75. · Venus Protocol, $11.2M: Venus’s lending markets took bad debt from a stale LUNA price. Hit venus in Lending & Borrowing.
  76. · Drift Trade, $14.5M: Drift’s v1 protocol lost funds during the LUNA collapse. Hit drift in Perp DEXs.
  77. · Ronin Bridge, $624M: The Ronin chain’s bridge validators’ keys were compromised. Hit ronin in Appchains / L3s; Ronin Bridge, refused in Bridges; Ronin, refused in L2 Blockchains; Ronin, refused in Sidechains.
  78. · Superfluid, $8.7M: Superfluid’s host contract was exploited on Polygon. Hit Superfluid, refused in Crypto Payroll; Superfluid, refused in Incentive Distribution; superfluid_streams in Crypto Subscriptions.
  79. · Multichain, $1.4M: Multichain’s router contracts were exploited through an approval flaw. Hit Multichain, refused in Bridges; Multichain, refused in Cross-Chain Swaps; Multichain / Anyswap anyTokens, refused in Cross-Chain Token Standards.
  80. · Crypto.com, $33.7M: Crypto.com App accounts were drained after two-factor checks were bypassed. Hit Crypto.com, refused in Crypto Neobanks.
  81. · Gamma, $4.5M: Visor Finance, the vault protocol that became Gamma, was drained a second time the same day. Hit gamma_strategies in Liquidity Management.
  82. · Gamma, $8.2M: Visor Finance, the vault protocol that became Gamma, was drained. Hit gamma_strategies in Liquidity Management.
  83. · Polygon, $2M: A flaw in Polygon PoS’s MATIC system contract (MRC20) was exploited before the fix. Hit polygon_pos in Sidechains; Polygon PoS, refused in L2 Blockchains; Polygon (Polygon PoS / POL), refused in Layer-1 Blockchains.
  84. · Mirror, $90M: Mirror Protocol on Terra lost funds to a collateral-validation flaw. Hit Mirror Protocol mAssets, Binance Stock Tokens, FTX (CM-Equity / Digital Assets AG) tokenised stocks, refused in Tokenised Equities.
  85. · Compound V2, $147M: Compound’s Proposal 62 distributed COMP in error. Hit compound in Lending & Borrowing.
  86. · DAO Maker Vesting, $4M: DAO Maker’s vesting contracts were drained again. Hit dao_maker in Token Launchpads.
  87. · DAO Maker Vesting, $7M: DAO Maker’s vesting contracts were drained. Hit dao_maker in Token Launchpads.
  88. · THORChain DEX, $8M: THORChain’s Ethereum bridge router was exploited a second time. Hit THORChain, refused in Bridges.
  89. · THORChain DEX, $5M: THORChain’s Ethereum bridge router was exploited. Hit THORChain, refused in Bridges.
  90. · Multichain, $7.9M: Multichain (then AnySwap) lost funds to a weak signing key on its V3 router. Hit Multichain, refused in Bridges; Multichain, refused in Cross-Chain Swaps; Multichain / Anyswap anyTokens, refused in Cross-Chain Token Standards.
  91. · Alchemix V2, $6.5M: Alchemix’s alETH pool minted unbacked debt. Hit Alchemix alUSD, refused in CDP Stablecoins.
  92. · Venus Protocol, $100M: Venus’s lending markets took bad debt after XVS collateral was manipulated. Hit venus in Lending & Borrowing.
  93. · PancakeSwap, $1.8M: PancakeSwap’s lottery contract was drained through an access-control flaw. Hit pancakeswap-dex in DEXs; pancakeswap in Web3 Apps.
  94. · DODO AMM, $3.8M: DODO’s V2 crowdpools were drained. Hit dodo in DEX Aggregators.
  95. · Yearn Finance, $11M: Yearn’s v1 yDAI vault was drained. Hit yearn in Yield Vaults; yearn_yieldagg in Yield Aggregators.
  96. · Origin Protocol, $7.7M: Origin’s OUSD vault was drained by reentrancy; the ranked Origin DeFi row is the same protocol. Hit origin_defi_yieldagg in Yield Aggregators.
  97. · KuCoin, $281M: KuCoin’s exchange hot wallets were drained. Hit KuCoin, refused in Exchanges.

By failure family

8 of 12 failure families have no failure in this corpus yet. They are marked uncalibrated: a criterion scores them, but no recorded failure has tested that criterion's question.

  • Contract failure — uncalibrated
  • Control failure — Bybit cold-wallet theft (February 2025) (Smart Accounts & Multisig: Upgrade control and key holders)
  • Oracle failure — uncalibrated
  • Verification failure — Nomad bridge exploit (August 2022) (Bridges: Trust posture); Multichain (July 2023) (Bridges: Trust posture)
  • Liveness failure — uncalibrated
  • Custody failure — uncalibrated
  • Insolvency failure — FTX (November 2022) (Exchanges: If this exchange fails — or freezes me — are the coins legally mine, and on whose terms?); Celsius Network (June 2022) (Exchanges: If this exchange fails — or freezes me — are the coins legally mine, and on whose terms?); Celsius Network (June 2022) (Institutional Custody: If they fail, are the assets still mine — or am I queueing as an unsecured creditor?)
  • Regulatory failure — uncalibrated
  • Execution failure — uncalibrated
  • Exit failure — FTX (November 2022) (Portfolio Tracking: What does the free tier quietly stop tracking, and will this app outlive my history?)
  • Key failure — uncalibrated
  • Information failure — uncalibrated
How this list is kept

A failure is listed only where a category's methodology record ties it to one of that category's published criteria. Each quote is checked word for word against its record on every build, and a criterion the category does not publish fails the build. The corpus was last read on . How each record is read and challenged is on the evidence process page.