{"license":"CC-BY-4.0","licenseUrl":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","attribution":"ChainChoice (https://chainchoice.io)","category":"liquid_lockers","evidenceReadAt":"2026-09-28","generatedAt":"2026-11-12","criteria":[{"id":"exit_realisability","label":"The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption","weight":35},{"id":"vote_and_bribe_pass_through","label":"Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor","weight":25},{"id":"base_protocol_unwind","label":"What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all","weight":20},{"id":"contract_control_incidents","label":"Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself","weight":20}],"providers":{"convex_finance_cvxcrv":{"exit_realisability":{"s":4,"q":"If a user deposits CRV into Convex, that CRV is locked forever on the platform as veCRV. | cvxCRV conversion is 1-way. Liquidity pools may exist that allow users to swap cvxCRV for CRV tokens.","u":"https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/why-convex/understanding-cvxcrv","d":"2026-09-28"},"vote_and_bribe_pass_through":{"s":6,"q":"There is a 17% total fee on all CRV revenue generated by Curve LP's on the platform. | 10% goes to cvxCRV stakers. This is paid out as CRV. | 4.5% goes to CVX stakers. This is paid out as cvxCRV. | 0.5% goes to the harvest caller. This is paid out as CRV.","u":"https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees","d":"2026-09-28"},"base_protocol_unwind":{"s":6,"q":"Convex has since sunsetted cvxFPIS and will be converting its FPIS to veFXS. Convex Finance will support the migration of both FPIS and cvxFPIS to cvxFXS at a 3 to 1 ratio","u":"https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/convex-for-frax-finance/fpis-to-fxs-migration","d":"2026-09-28"},"contract_control_incidents":{"s":8,"q":"Multisig Members (3 of 5) | Tommy - Votium | Admin controls do not have access to user funds or other dangerous calls and thus time-lock delays are not required.","u":"https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/multisig-admin-rights","d":"2026-09-28"}},"stake_dao_sdcrv":{"exit_realisability":{"s":3,"q":"The sdToken/token exchange rate fluctuates based on market demand. You can always exit via DEX liquidity pools. | The locker locks tokens for maximum duration and continuously re-locks","u":"https://docs.stakedao.org/liquidlockers","d":"2026-09-28"},"vote_and_bribe_pass_through":{"s":7,"q":"Stake DAO replicates each underlying protocol vote—both gauge allocations and protocol governance proposals—allowing sdToken holders to vote directly. | When you vote with your sdTokens, the Liquid Locker casts votes on the underlying protocol proportionally to sdToken holder preferences.","u":"https://docs.stakedao.org/sdvote","d":"2026-09-28"},"base_protocol_unwind":{"s":7,"q":"Therefore, Stake DAO has agreed with Frax, Angle, Curve and Convex to create an Emergency DAO, which will be able to close any vote that seems malicious and disregard the final result. | An emergency DAO vote would require at least four votes to pass, each member has one vote.","u":"https://gov.stakedao.org/t/sdip-17-create-emergency-daos-for-sdangle-angle-sdfxs-fxs-and-sdcrv-crv-liquid-lockers/676","d":"2026-09-28"},"contract_control_incidents":{"s":4,"q":"The root cause is an incomplete ownership handover, not a flaw in the contracts. | approximately 43.8 ETH (~$91,000) | was secured to the governance Safe within 47 minutes of the forged mint | All privileged roles previously held by the compromised account now sit with the governance multisig (3 of…","u":"https://www.stakedao.org/blog/incident-disclosure-27-05-2026","d":"2026-09-28"}},"yearn_ycrv":{"exit_realisability":{"s":3,"q":"Liquid locker tokens are not redeemable for the underlying locked tokens as they are continually max-locked into the underlying VE systems.","u":"https://docs.yearn.fi/getting-started/products/ylockers/ycrv/ycrv-faq","d":"2026-09-28"},"vote_and_bribe_pass_through":{"s":6,"q":"No. User voting is not part of the yLockers system | Gauge voting is automated to optimize for the maximum weekly vote incentive yield. | The Yearn governance multisig will retain the sole ability to cast votes in the Curve DAO.","u":"https://docs.yearn.fi/getting-started/products/ylockers/ycrv/ycrv-faq","d":"2026-09-28"},"base_protocol_unwind":{"s":5,"q":"it cannot be unwrapped as it is forever max-locked into the veCRV system","u":"https://docs.yearn.fi/getting-started/products/ylockers/ycrv/overview","d":"2026-09-28"},"contract_control_incidents":{"s":8,"q":"The entire balance of 3,794,894 lp-yCRVv2 tokens was swapped | 63% slippage and 1,416,975 usd realized loss | it did not contain any user funds","u":"https://github.com/yearn/yearn-security/blob/master/disclosures/2023-12-11.md","d":"2026-09-28"}},"clever_clevcvx":{"exit_realisability":{"s":2,"q":"Once in the Furnace, these tokens are swapped for their clevToken equivalent at par (1:1), then the clevTokens are burned.","u":"https://docs.aladdin.club/clever/the-furnace","d":"2026-09-28"},"vote_and_bribe_pass_through":{"s":4,"q":"Raise the fee for CVX harvest yields from 20% to 30%. The additional 10% above the original 20% fee will be sent directly to the furnace, increasing its burn rate.","u":"https://snapshot.box/#/s:veclev.eth/proposal/0x35d42b87c5570c7d26c0e8542b77e59c738e4e13dc9c3be77c538e26e5f3c940","d":"2026-09-28"},"base_protocol_unwind":{"s":4,"q":"For collateral strategies which require an underlying lock, such as CVX -> vlCVX in Convex, users must request an unlock and wait for the underlying unlock before withdrawing. Collateral does not earn yield after unlock has been requested.","u":"https://docs.aladdin.club/clever/the-clever","d":"2026-09-28"},"contract_control_incidents":{"s":6,"q":"SECBIT_CLever_Update_Report_20260909.pdf | SECBIT_CLever_Update_Report_2026_07_29.pdf","u":"https://github.com/AladdinDAO/aladdin-v3-contracts/tree/main/audit-reports","d":"2026-09-28"}},"pirex_pxcvx":{"exit_realisability":{"s":6,"q":"uint32 public constant MAX_REDEMPTION_TIME = 17 weeks; | uint256 feePercent = feeMax - (((feeMax - feeMin) * waitTime) / MAX_REDEMPTION_TIME);","u":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dinero-protocol/pirex-convex/master/contracts/PirexCvx.sol","d":"2026-09-28"},"vote_and_bribe_pass_through":{"s":5,"q":"Pirex will also vote on your behalf to secure bribe rewards. However, you'll need to manually claim these rewards yourself.","u":"https://docs.llama.airforce/ucvx.md","d":"2026-09-28"},"base_protocol_unwind":{"s":4,"q":"This proposal is authored by both the Dinero and Plume team and outlines a strategic proposal for the absorption of the entirety of the Dinero Protocol into the Plume ecosystem and the dissolution of the Dinero DAO | If this proposal passes, the Dinero DAO will be dissolved and DINERO (and…","u":"https://forum.dinero.xyz/api/internal/trpc/thread.getThreadById?input=%7B%22thread_id%22%3A1305032%7D","d":"2026-09-28"},"contract_control_incidents":{"s":6,"q":"Overall, all findings have either been dealt with or sufficiently acknowledged.","u":"https://omniscia.io/reports/pirex-multi-token-convex-wrapper/","d":"2026-09-28"}}}}