Perp House Vaults

Risk-isolated per-market house vaults where the LP is the traders' counterparty, protected by a named automatic on-chain deleveraging rule (MAX_PNL_FACTOR_FOR_ADL) rather than a human vote, with a full-life realised-PnL series retrievable keylessly but only by assembling it yourself. Strongest on “When one trader's win is bigger than the pool, who pulls the plug — a rule I can read, or a vote I'll never hear?” (9/10): GMX publishes an automatic auto-deleveraging rule that reduces profitable positions when pending PnL relative to pool value exceeds each market's MAX_PNL_FACTOR_FOR_ADL, plus per-side open-interest and pool-amount caps. The ADL threshold value itself is not printed in the docs. Weakest on “Who eats the loss before I do — and if I try to leave first, how much do they take?” (6/10): Each GM pool is risk-isolated, so depositors carry only the markets they enter, and the docs state plainly that trader profit comes out of pool value. No capital sits beneath the depositor and no exit fee scales with pool solvency. Published price: From https://docs.gmx.io/docs/providing-liquidity.md, fetched 2026-09-28: "liquidity providers earn the majority of the fees generated from trading, liquidations, borrow fees, and swaps (63% on Arbitrum and Avalanche)" and "On Arbitrum and Avalanche, 63% of…

Best for: Pool protection mechanism — 9/10

Single ERC-4626 USDC vault on Base that is the counterparty to every Avantis perp trade, protected by a published per-trade profit cap of 2500% of collateral and a solvency-indexed withdrawal-fee schedule. Strongest on “When one trader's win is bigger than the pool, who pulls the plug — a rule I can read, or a vote I'll never hear?” (9/10): Veranta (formerly Avantis) caps a single position's profit at 2500% of collateral for most markets and caps open interest per market and side, with total capacity scaling with vault size. It publishes no auto-deleveraging for a winning position already in the money. Weakest on “How much has this vault already lost when a trader won — and can I check that number myself, today, for free?” (6/10): The operator serves only 60 trailing daily share-rate points, not an inception series; the full history has to be assembled from the ERC-4626 share price onchain. Its one loss figure is an undated 30bps worst single-day drawdown, printed beside a claim of no realized losses since August 2024. Published price: Deposits are free and there is no documented management or performance fee; the only price the depositor pays is a solvency-indexed withdrawal fee.

Best for: Pool protection mechanism — 9/10

The pool's only documented junior tranche — and, post-upgrade, barely a house vault: OLP now earns opening fees only, with the real counterparty an offchain Jump Trading mirror hedge. Its loss record can be rebuilt from a keyless Ostium subgraph the docs never point depositors at, but it prices OLP only at settlement, so it showed no loss for 60 days after the July 2026 vault drain, until a 69.2% write-down on 12 September 2026; the operator's own pages mention neither. Strongest on “When one trader's win is bigger than the pool, who pulls the plug — a rule I can read, or a vote I'll never hear?” (8/10): Ostium automatically blocks new OLP deposits once its buffer is depleted and losses draw on OLP, and caps open interest per pair. Neither force-closes a winning trader, and the security-event carve-out behind the September 2026 write-down sits outside the deposit block. Weakest on “Who eats the loss before I do — and if I try to leave first, how much do they take?” (5/10): OLP is documented as senior to a buffer, but security events hit OLP first. On 12 September 2026 the OLP price was written down 69.2%, about $23.66M, after the July vault drain. The buffer, replenished offchain by Jump Trading, was about 0.19% of OLP on 25 September. The docs mention neither event. Published price: From https://docs.ostium.com/traders/reference/fees.md, fetched 2026-09-28: "Opening fees split between two destinations: 30% flows to OLP holders at each daily settlement, and the remainder funds protocol operations and development.

Best for: Pool protection mechanism — 8/10

Solana perp DEX's staker-owned first-loss backstop: you are the equity tranche that pays trader bankruptcies, behind a 13-day cooldown whose payout can only be revised downward. Strongest on “When one trader's win is bigger than the pool, who pulls the plug — a rule I can read, or a vote I'll never hear?” (8/10): Velocity caps what each market can draw from the insurance fund by tier, limits a winner's settleable profit to realised P&L plus the P&L pool's excess, and can delist a market at a solvency-adjusted price. Live per-market draw caps are admin-set, from $5,000 to $180,000. Weakest on “Who eats the loss before I do — and if I try to leave first, how much do they take?” (3/10): Stakers' principal pays bankruptcies, with only the market's in-transit insurance fee ahead of it. After a 13-day cooldown the payout is the lower of current and request-time value, and an unstake cannot complete while utilization or its average exceeds 90%. Each market's fund is ring-fenced. Published price: From https://docs.velocity.exchange/protocol/trading/trading-fees, fetched 2026-09-29: staking carries no deposit, management or performance fee; what the Insurance Fund earns from perp trading is a share of each taker fee's remainder.

Best for: Pool protection mechanism — 8/10