Liquid Lockers

Liquid Lockers evaluated across the cost of exit; who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor; what happens if the base protocol changes or dies; and the wrapper's own contract control and incident record.

5providers tracked

5ranked (methodology v2026.11.1)

12 November 2026Ranking snapshot

28 September 2026oldest read · due 12 Nov

Independent. Evidence-based.We rank with a published method and sourced evidence. No one can pay to rank.How it works

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5 providers match your requirements

Out of 5 ranked providers. 0 excluded.

What this ranks

Ranked here: liquid lockers, protocols that lock your governance token into a vote-escrow contract on your behalf and give you a transferable receipt you cannot convert back.Not ranked here: protocols that do not lock a governance token into a vote-escrow contract on the depositor's behalf and mint a transferable receipt.5 of the 5 assessed are ranked.Requirements narrow the list; they never change a published ChainChoice Score. How the ranking works

Convex Finance (cvxCRV)

How Convex Finance (cvxCRV) was chosen

Wins the weighted total without leading any single criterion

The category's dominant wrapper

79 out of 100published score, #1 of all 5 worldwide

Evidence

High

4/4 criteria scored, with 4 dated sources quoted.

Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itselfWho controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor

Why it leads

Convex Finance (cvxCRV) is 2 points ahead of Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted), mainly because it scores higher on its contract control incidents and its base protocol unwind.
Ahead of Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted) on contract control incidents (+2.5 points) and base protocol unwind (+2.5 points)
Provider states broad availability

Tradeoff

Exit realisability: 2 points below the best in this ranking

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The wrapper

77 out of 100

Yearn's veCRV liquid locker

76 out of 100

The second-largest veCRV wrapper

75 out of 100

CLever locks depositors' CVX into vlCVX and...

67 out of 100

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See key differences in features, fees, security and more.

Exit realisability

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption

35% of the published criteria weight. Scored 0–10 from the published evidence; the order below is by this criterion, then the published ranking.

Provider	Exit realisability (0–10)	ChainChoice Score
Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)	6	77
Convex Finance (cvxCRV)	4	79
Yearn yCRV	3	76
Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)	3	75
CLever (clevCVX, AladdinDAO)	2	67

Contract control incidents

Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself

20% of the published criteria weight. Scored 0–10 from the published evidence; the order below is by this criterion, then the published ranking.

Provider	Contract control incidents (0–10)	ChainChoice Score
Convex Finance (cvxCRV)	8	79
Yearn yCRV	8	76
Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)	6	77
CLever (clevCVX, AladdinDAO)	6	67
Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)	4	75

Vote and bribe pass through

Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor

25% of the published criteria weight. Scored 0–10 from the published evidence; the order below is by this criterion, then the published ranking.

Provider	Vote and bribe pass through (0–10)	ChainChoice Score
Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)	7	75
Convex Finance (cvxCRV)	6	79
Yearn yCRV	6	76
Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)	5	77
CLever (clevCVX, AladdinDAO)	4	67

Base protocol unwind

What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all

20% of the published criteria weight. Scored 0–10 from the published evidence; the order below is by this criterion, then the published ranking.

Provider	Base protocol unwind (0–10)	ChainChoice Score
Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)	7	75
Convex Finance (cvxCRV)	6	79
Yearn yCRV	5	76
Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)	4	77
CLever (clevCVX, AladdinDAO)	4	67

All 4 published criteria

Every ranked row’s score on each criterion, in the published order. Choose a column to order by it.

	Provider					ChainChoice Score
1	Convex Finance (cvxCRV)	4	6	6	8	79
2	Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)	6	5	4	6	77
3	Yearn yCRV	3	6	5	8	76
4	Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)	3	7	7	4	75
5	CLever (clevCVX, AladdinDAO)	2	4	4	6	67

How this ranking works

How firm the #1 is, the per-criterion arithmetic behind each score, who pays ChainChoice, and which liquid lockers were assessed and left out.

FirmThis verdict holds under every one-point re-read

See the arithmetic

Every published criterion was moved up and down by one point and the ranking re-run. The same product came first each time. The published rankings file

Why this score4 published criteria · leads 1 of 4

Published criterionWtScore, and the best hereGap out of 10Pts

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption8.4−244.5

Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor6−164.8

What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all4.8−163.8

Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself4.8·85.1

Σ methodology points18.2/32

Each bar is the score on that criterion’s own 0–10 scale, never rescaled to the pool. The dark line is the best any product here reached on that axis. Wt is the most the criterion can add to the 86-point weighted total. Pts is weight × score × 32; the sum is the methodology score, and each weighted point behind the leader costs 2.6 on the displayed score. how these are weighted

Why it ranks first

Why Convex Finance (cvxCRV) leads this category right now

The category's dominant wrapper — 421.5m veCRV, 54.13% of all voting escrow — issuing a receipt that has no redemption at any price and cleared 56.29% below the underlying on a $100k exit at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28). Strongest on contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself (8/10): cvxCRV is minted only through the non-upgradeable CrvDepositor. The Booster fee settings and the staking wrapper answer to a 3-of-5 Safe with no modules; Convex states that time-lock delays are not required, a capped fee-setter role sits with an EOA, and a June 2026 audit covers the voting contracts. Weakest on the exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption (4/10): cvxCRV has no redemption; Convex calls the conversion 1-way. Its deepest venue, the Curve cvxCRV/CRV pool, returns 56.29% less than NAV on a $100,000 exit and 55.13% less on $10,000 at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28). Published price: Re-fetched 2026-09-28 from https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees (HTTP 200; the same text is served as Markdown at /convexfinance/faq/fees.md).

Best for

Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself — 8/10

Main tradeoff

The buyer should decide on one number and one structural fact. The number: 56.29%. That is what a $100,000-equivalent cvxCRV position converted to on 2026-09-28 at Ethereum block 26,074,948, against 53.02% at block 25,738,905 on 2026-08-12 — and there is no contractual alternative to it. cvxCRV cannot be redeemed: burn() is operator-gated, the operator is CrvDepositor, and CrvDepositor's source contains no burn call at all. The structural fact: Convex is not a wrapper of the Curve wars, it is the Curve wars. 421,498,943 veCRV, 54.13% of the 778,719,436 total at block 26,074,948, sits behind a receipt whose holders neither vote nor receive any vote incentive. That is a defensible trade at a 56% discount to NAV — the cash yield is real, 100% of the veCRV admin fee passes through untaxed, and the split is verifiable to the basis point from deployed getters. It is not defensible for anyone who may need principal back. Three cautions, two of them corrections to the prior draft. First, the discount is measured against a pool holding 2.51m CRV against 58.80m cvxCRV on 2026-09-28 — a 23.4:1 imbalance in which the pool IS the market; at $500,000 the discount reached 61.20%. Second, the governance stack is audited: a June 2026 audit of the on-chain voting contracts is published in the docs, and the control score is 8. Third, and cutting the other way: Votium — the operator of the vote-incentive market whose revenue never reaches cvxCRV holders — holds one of the five keys on the 3-of-5 multisig that owns the Booster, the VoterProxy and the staking wrapper. Finally, the documentation ages faster than the contracts: the fee page footer still reads 'Last updated 2 years ago', and the Tokenomics page still advertises cvxPrisma rewards in mkUSD from a protocol whose every domain now fails to resolve. Verify fee parameters from the Booster, not the docs.

Verify before signup

Re-fetched 28 September 2026 from https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees (HTTP 200; the same text is served as Markdown at /convexfinance/faq/fees.md). Curve: "There is a 17% total fee on all CRV revenue generated by Curve LP's on the platform." Breakdown: "10% goes to cvxCRV stakers. This is paid out as CRV." / "4.5% goes to CVX stakers. This is paid out as cvxCRV." / "2% goes to treasury, which goes to treasury as CRV" / "0.5% goes to the harvest caller. This is paid out as CRV." Carve-out: "Fees are taken only from CRV revenue; no fees are taken from tokens from incentivized Curve pools, nor from veCRV admin fees". Mutability: "Fees can be adjusted between hard-coded ranges." with "10-15% for cvxCRV stakers rewards", "3-6% for CVX staker rewards" and "There is an absolute fee ceiling of 20%". The page lists no deposit or withdrawal fee. On-chain cross-check (eth_call, Booster 0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31, Ethereum block 26,074,948, 2026-09-28T09:06:35Z): lockIncentive()=1000, stakerIncentive()=450, platformFee()=200, earmarkIncentive()=50, FEE_DENOMINATOR()=10000 — worked example: (1000+450+200+50)/10000 = 17.00%, the same getters as on 12 August 2026. The page footer still reads "Last updated 2 years ago".

Recommendation summary

What should decide this category

Can you redeem into the underlying by contract, or is a secondary-market bid the only exit that exists?

What is the discount at the size YOU would exit — not at the size the marketing quotes?

Does your receipt direct the underlying vote, and what share of fees and vote incentives actually reaches you?

If the base protocol changed its rules tomorrow, has this wrapper written down what happens?

Quick picks

Strong options in this category

Start with the lead choice first, then use the shortlist only if you still need a challenger or stronger fit for a specific setup.

Best overall

Convex Finance (cvxCRV)

Best for: Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself — 8/10

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption · weight 35%4/10Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor · weight 25%6/10What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all · weight 20%6/10Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself · weight 20%8/10

Quick pick

Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted)

The wrapper whose sponsor dissolved but whose contract did not: pxCVX still burns back to CVX at NAV, permissionless and exercised five times in the week checked, at a fee that on 2026-09-28 ran from 4.91% for the lock unlocking 2026-10-01 to 1.15% for the one unlocking 2027-01-21 — while its only quotable Curve venue priced a $100,000 exit 41.87% below NAV the same day. Strongest on the exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption (6/10): Any holder can redeem pxCVX for CVX at NAV through the immutable PirexCvx contract, with a time-based fee of 1.15% to 4.91% and a wait of up to 17 weeks; there is no instant exit. The lpxCvx/CVX pool returns 41.87% less than NAV on a $100,000 exit at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28). Weakest on what happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all (4/10): pxCVX wraps vlCVX, whose locks expire, so the base position can unwind, but the contract's emergency executor is unset. The only written contingency is an FAQ line with no ratio, date or proposal id, and the sponsor's forum carries a proposal to dissolve the Dinero DAO that never mentions pxCVX. Published price: Pirex publishes no first-party fee page for pxCVX; the terms live in the protocol's own source and deployed contract.

Best for: The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption — 6/10

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption · weight 35%6/10Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor · weight 25%5/10What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all · weight 20%4/10Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself · weight 20%6/10

Quick pick

Yearn yCRV

Yearn's veCRV liquid locker: CRV is minted 1:1 into yCRV and locked forever, the revenue split is enforced by a deployed on-chain splitter, and the only exit is a single Curve pool that priced a $100,000 exit 55.35% below the underlying on 2026-09-28. Strongest on contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself (8/10): yCRV is a non-upgradeable token. The voter, strategy proxy and fee splitter answer to Yearn's 6-of-9 Safe, which by stated design has no timelock. Yearn's 2023-12-11 disclosure quantifies a 1,416,975 usd realised loss on protocol-owned liquidity that contained no user funds. Weakest on the exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption (3/10): yCRV is not redeemable for the CRV it locks. Its only deep venue, the Curve yCRV pool, returns 55.35% less than the underlying on a $100,000 exit and 46.63% less on $10,000 at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28); the CRV side holds about $133,000. Published price: Re-fetched 2026-09-28 (HTTP 200). docs.yearn.fi/getting-started/products/ylockers/overview: "Every yLocker charges a 10% performance fee on the total revenue it receives each week." The same page states what reaches stakers: "100% of their share of protocol…

Best for: Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself — 8/10

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption · weight 35%3/10Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor · weight 25%6/10What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all · weight 20%5/10Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself · weight 20%8/10

Quick pick

Stake DAO (sdCRV Liquid Locker)

The second-largest veCRV wrapper (118,470,811 veCRV, 15.21% of supply, re-read at block 26,074,948 on 2026-09-28): the only major CRV wrapper whose receipt holders actually direct the underlying vote, and 85% of harvested Curve revenue reaches them per a deployed contract getter — but the deposit is permanent, the only exit is its own Curve pool at a 54.95% haircut on $100,000, and the getter that sets that 85% answers to a 3-of-5 multisig with no timelock. Strongest on who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor (7/10): sdCRV holders direct Curve gauge and governance votes through vote replication. The deployed accumulator takes 5% for the treasury and 10% for liquidity, so 85% of harvested Curve revenue reaches the sdCRV gauge; a 3-of-5 Safe can change that split without delay, and the vote-incentive fee is described only as small. Weakest on the exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption (3/10): sdCRV has no redemption. Its only exit, the Curve sdCRV/CRV pool, returns 54.95% less than the underlying CRV on a $100,000 exit and 46.76% less on $10,000 at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28); the pool's CRV side holds about $141,000. Published price: Re-fetched 2026-09-28: docs.stakedao.org/lockerfees (HTTP 200) states "Liquid Locker fees are performance fees only — charged when rewards are harvested, not on deposits or withdrawals." and declines to print the rate on the page: "Current fee rates are…

Best for: Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor — 7/10

The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption · weight 35%3/10Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor · weight 25%7/10What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all · weight 20%7/10Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself · weight 20%4/10

Considered and not ranked

None left out by name

We assessed 5 products here and rank all 5. No product has been turned away by name; when one is, its name and the reason appear here. Evidence last read 28 September 2026.

What this ranking does not assess

Regulatory failure: no licence where you are, or a forced market exit.
Execution failure: you get a worse price, later, or nothing.

These can still cost you money here; the ranking does not measure them, so a high place says nothing about them. Which criterion scores each family, and why the others do not apply, is in /data/risk-coverage.json.

How this ranking is built

Reviewed on the exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption, who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor, what happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all, and contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself.

Data checked Sep 2026 · Independent rankings · We show our work

Reviewed 28 September 2026Next review by 12 November 2026Published 13 August 2026Methodology v2026.11.1

How this page is reviewed

Reviewed means every product ranked on this page was read against its sources on or after that date; every ranked category is re-read at least every 45 days. Models research, extract and parse. A deterministic engine ranks. Every quote passes an adversarial refute pass.

Accountable for this review: Mathias Siemonsmeier, Founder.

How we review · Review calendar · Corrections log · How we make money

Direct answer

What is the best liquid locker in 2026?

Convex Finance (cvxCRV) ranks #1 overall for liquid lockers on ChainChoice. The category's dominant wrapper — 421.5m veCRV, 54.13% of all voting escrow — issuing a receipt that has no redemption at any price and cleared 56.29% below the underlying on a $100k exit at Ethereum block 26,074,948 (2026-09-28). It holds that rank under an affiliate-blind methodology scored across 4 published, weighted criteria — the code that ranks providers physically cannot read affiliate payouts (CI-enforced), so a payout can't move a rank. The verdict re-computes on every fee change, incident, or regulatory action; the full reasoning and the audit receipt are under Methodology.

How you can lose money here, and what the ranking scores

Contract failure: the code holding the funds is exploited.
Scored by What happens if the base protocol changes or dies, and whether the wrapper can unwind at all · 20% (Convex Finance (cvxCRV) 6/10, Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted) 4/10, Yearn yCRV 5/10)
Scored by Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself · 20% (Convex Finance (cvxCRV) 8/10, Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted) 6/10, Yearn yCRV 8/10)
Control failure: a key or vote changes the rules, freezes or mints.
Scored by Who controls the votes and the bribes, and what reaches the depositor · 25% (Convex Finance (cvxCRV) 6/10, Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted) 5/10, Yearn yCRV 6/10)
Exit failure: you cannot get out at par, on time, or with what is yours.
Scored by The exit that does not exist: measured discount and any contractual redemption · 35% (Convex Finance (cvxCRV) 4/10, Pirex (pxCVX, Redacted) 6/10, Yearn yCRV 3/10)

Not assessed by this ranking: Regulatory failure, Execution failure. A high place says nothing about these; the Methodology tab says what each means.

FAQs

4 questions readers ask before choosing liquid lockers.

Frequently asked

Questions people ask before choosing liquid lockers

Can I convert back to the underlying token?

On most of these, no — and the protocols say so plainly. Convex's documentation states that "cvxCRV conversion is 1-way", and the underlying veCRV lock has no early-withdraw path at all, which caps what any CRV wrapper can offer however well run it is. That leaves the secondary market as the only exit, and it is currently expensive: measured at a $100,000-equivalent size on 2026-08-12, the discounts to the underlying ran 52.96%, 53.72%, 50.59% and 72.07% across four of the receipts here. The exception is worth seeking out — a contract-enforced redemption at net asset value, even a capped and queued one, is a categorically different product from a Curve pool, because the queue is an obligation and the pool is a convenience that can empty.

Why is the discount quoted at two different sizes?

Because it changes the answer completely, and quoting one number would mislead. The same receipt on the same day showed a 4.53% discount at a $10,000 exit and 72.15% at $100,000 — a sixteen-fold difference driven entirely by pool depth. So every discount on this page names the pool, the chain, the block and the date, and reports both sizes. One provider makes the point starkly: its Curve pool held 0.52 CVX when read on 2026-08-12. There is no size at which that is a market, and it is scored as the absence of an exit rather than as an expensive one.

Does my receipt actually get the votes and the bribes?

Often not the votes, and the fee share varies by protocol. The receipt token and the voting token are frequently different tokens held by different people: Convex publishes its split to the decimal — a 17% total fee on CRV revenue, of which 10% goes to cvxCRV stakers, 4.5% to CVX stakers, 2% to treasury and 0.5% to the harvest caller — while gauge weights are directed by vlCVX holders, not by the cvxCRV holder who funded the lock. That is disclosure working exactly as it should, and it still means you bought a permanent governance position that somebody else spends. Elsewhere, documented vote replication does pass the governance right through to the receipt holder, which is the meaningful difference to look for.

What happens if the protocol underneath changes the rules?

This category has just watched it happen twice, so the question is not hypothetical. One major vote-escrow protocol stripped its lock token of fee rights and gauge direction and announced wind-down on 24 March 2026 after a roughly $110m exploit; the wrapper built on it now redeems holders at 90% of the underlying on 10 May 2027 — a documented ratio and a documented date, which is the good version of this outcome. A second protocol paused ALL new lock creation at 00:00 UTC on 29 January 2026, leaving its wrappers holding a claim on a lock that can no longer be made. Sixteen candidates were checked and rejected on dated evidence to assemble a pool of six. What separates the survivors is not whether their base protocol might change — it is whether a numbered, passed governance document says what happens when it does, and whether the wrapper spans more than one base protocol. Treat a wrapper of a wrapper as compounding exposure, not diversification.

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Best picks

Best liquid lockers in 2026

You are being asked to convert a governance token into a receipt, permanently. Convex states it in its own documentation: "cvxCRV conversion is 1-way". So the only money you can actually get back is whatever the secondary market will pay, and on 2026-08-12 that market was pricing these receipts 39% to 54% below the asset they represent — 52.96% for cvxCRV, 53.72% for sdCRV, 50.59% for yCRV and 72.07% for clevCVX, all measured at a $100,000-equivalent exit. That size qualifier is not pedantry: one receipt shows 4.53% at $10,000 and 72.15% at $100,000, a sixteen-fold difference in the same asset on the same day, which is why every discount here is quoted at two sizes and why any single-number quote for these instruments is close to meaningless. A contract-enforced redemption at net asset value therefore outranks any market price, because a bid can vanish and an obligation cannot. Then ask what the lock actually earns you: the receipt you hold and the token that votes are frequently different tokens held by different people, so read the published fee split to the decimal rather than the marketing about maximised yield.

Best overall

Convex Finance (cvxCRV)

Data checked Sep 2026

Best for: Contract control and dated incident record of the wrapper itself — 8/10

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Every ranked provider, its full verdict

How this category is defined

Liquid Lockers: overview, criteria and weights

Written and reviewed by Mathias Siemonsmeier Founder

Not financial advice · For informational purposes only · Always do your own research

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Why it leads

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